The recent announcement of Australia sending the SASR to Afghanistan along with a Provincial Reconstruction Team points to the unfocused nature of Australia's involvement in the American led "War on Terror". The Howard government chose to join the United States pursuit of terrorism as a military issue. This is in part due to the "Great and Powerful Friends" (GAPF) doctrine of foreign policy that the Liberal Party adheres to. But equally influential on our policy toward Afghanistan has been the weak manner in which Australia has contributed. We are not in control of the outcome, and consequentially the Howard government is just floating along with no focus, and no possible means to take the expeditions in Afghanistan and Iraq to any conclusion. Australia needs to return to the policy of December 2001, pull out of Iraq, and focus its full energies on defeating Al Queda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Afghanistan In December of 2001, Australia sent the SASR over to Afghanistan to contribute in the over-throw of the Taliban. Australia's policy then was that our military were there for the "War on Terror", not for "Afghanistan". Recently explaining the recent resending of the SASR back to Afghanistan John Howard said;
When Australia withdrew those forces [SASR from Afghanistan in 2002], they were withdrawn against a background that it has always been the Australian position that we would provide some support of an elite kind at the sharp end, and that we were never disposed at the beginning to have that long-term - what I might loosely call - peacekeeping role ...Between the deployments of the SASR in Afghanistan, Australian maintained a personnel of one in the country - a mine clearance officer. This was fitting with the original Australian policy. Our commitment was minimal, and contributed to the over-throw of the Taliban, unfortunately, in the US, the political climate changed and Afghanistan was quickly cast aside, and Iraq focused on. Australia's GAPF foreign policy meant that John Howard found himself joining the American and British governments in selling a war to an often cynical and unbelieving public. Afghanistan was never followed through entirely to ensure that the Taliban and Al Queda would not resurge in the mountain ranges of the Pakistani border. Australia did not commit sufficient troops to pursue that goal without American and British support. As a consequence, when the SASR, along with American forces, were moved to the Iraqi border, the Taliban and Al Queda were able to regroup in the harsh eastern Afghan country. Iraq Australia followed the United States into Iraq, with the Australian Defence Force (ADF) committing aircraft, special forces, naval vessels and logistical support to the operation. This was quickly wound down after the initial success of the American march on Baghdad. After hostilities ceased the largest numbers of ADF members in the Gulf were an ANZAC Frigate and a Surface to Air Weapon System - totalling approximately 1600 troops. With the recent deployment of 450 additional troops this brings Australia's current commitment to approximately 2000 troops. John Howard did not make any policy commitment on Iraq, preferring to balance the reticence of a public still not behind the conflict, and the pressure from the United States, Britain and other nations to commit greater forces. Like Afghanistan, it has meant that Australia can have no effect on the outcome, we are dependant upon American success for Australian success. Richard Woolcott commented;
The reality is that Australia's presence, however capable and efficient our forces, can make no meaningful contribution to the two major objectives: the reconstruction of that country [Iraq] and the establishment of a viable democratic government there.Iraq is an American project that requires an American response - lots of troops, lots of money and lots of patience for an ongoing medium intensity conflict. Only the United States can handle that. Australia is best playing to its strengths, and focusing on Afghanistan. The SASR are the very tip of the spear in the ADF's land capability, but the spear gets fat pretty quickly with the Australian Army - 1st RAR and 4th RAR both maintain commando battalions. These forces are ideally suited to the Afghanistan conflict which is a low intensity, low tempo, land based conflict requiring a high level of skill and training at the individual and platoon level. The Australian Army has always over-excelled in these situations, and presently has existing assets that fulfil that role perfectly. Clarity of Policy Australia's response in 2002 toward Afghanistan should have been an escalation of our commitment there with the purpose of eradicating Al Queda and the Taliban. Iraq was a diversion, a distraction that has defrayed Australian policy; leaving it unfocused. Australia needs the clarity of policy again that was present in December of 2001. Australia needs to remove its forces from Iraq and make a commitment to the United States and Afghanistan that it will see the "War on Terror" in Afghanistan through to its natural conclusion - which is the eradication of Al Queda and Taliban operatives from the country. We should deploy the commando battalions as well as another Regiment to Afghanistan along with the necessary Army and Air Force airlift capability. The SASR and Commando Battalions will be able to range independently while the RAR will have the capability to do insertion and extraction with Australian rotating and fixed blade air assets. More importantly, Australia should establish a command and control structure in Afghanistan where Australian commanders are entirely in control of Australian forces. We have not seen the rise of a Monash or Williams in the recent campaigns because Australian forces have been deployed piecemeal under other nation's forces. Australian solutions to Australian problems are superior, and with Australia taking responsibility and ownership of the destruction of Al Queda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, it will allow Australian commanders to pursue that goal by managing the Australian forces at their most efficient and full capability. Conclusion The Australian troops would not be in Afghanistan for nation-building, manning checkpoints, or doing police work. They would be focused on a military goal, and an achievable outcome. This would not be politically untenable with the Australian public and would most likely enjoy greater popularity than the current piecemeal and ad-hoc deployment of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The deployment of the SASR, Commando Battalions and a RAR to Afghanistan along with the support infrastructure, including command and control as well as air assets, would allow Australia to pursue a focused policy that would have genuine value in the conflict with organized Wahabi Extremism. It would give Australia a national and political purpose beyond following whatever the great and powerful friend does. Australia would have ownership over a very important component of this conflict, one that is quantifiable, and one that has an publicly knowable ending. cam
