The Department of External Affairs was still a young government department when Percy Spender took over its reins in 1949 with the successful election of the Menzies Government. Spender was a powerful member of the Liberal Cabinet, and one who Menzies was concerned about as a potential challenger to his leadership of the Liberal Party. Spender's forebears, Doc Evatt and John Burton had attempted to balance direct relationships with super-powers, alongside multi-national foreign policy through the UN with an engagement of Australia's Asian interests through regional foreign policy. Spender came to the department with the ideological lines of the Cold War establishing themselves, he chose the path of whole heartedly embracing the dominant western super-power while maintaining regional foreign policy ties.
Political Realities Post WWII Robert Menzies was an anglophile of the edwardian dandy school of pomp and circumstance. Despite Menzies' desire for Australia to re-establish itself as British, the reality of the clouds building over what was to become the Cold War showed that America was the new super-power in the west. Britain's back had been broken in World War II, and the incredible scientific, manufacturing and economic might of the United States would come to define the West's response to Soviet Russia.
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, there was a stand off as many governments and nations eyed each other warily wondering what the new system of nation-state power would be. Europe's colonial power was broken, that was obvious, and the United Nations was being set up to establish a forum, and means for the new super-powers to engage in dialogue. By 1950 it had become obvious that there was an ideological war brewing, mainly over what constituted economic management of a nation-state; but which was backed by large and effective militaries.
Due to the constant political salesmanship and mythology of the US alliance, it is assumed that Australia is contributing from a position of weakness. This is as untrue today as it was in 1945. Power politics is played through strength - of which hard and soft power are the two largest determinants. These are acquired by military and economic capability. At the end of World War II Australia was the largest and most powerful of the medium powers. With the defeat of Germany and Japan, Australia had the fourth largest air force on the globe. Our economy was booming so much in the latter parts of World War II that the Citizens Military Forces were being demobilised to attend to the labour shortages and demands of the Australian economy.
Australia's problem has been our politicians, continually dealing our interests with a political cringe. This has manifested itself with Australia being subservant and uncritical toward the current super-power. Prior to World War II this was Britain, since Curtin looked to the East without a pang of regret in 1941, it has been the United States.
Percy Spender Percy Spender was a barrister, and an experienced minister when he took over the Department of External Affairs. He was well known for brutally efficient and well prepared. Spender spent sixteen months as foreign minister, and then seven years as Australia's Ambassador to Washington. Due to Australia's entwining with the US on foreign policy and defence, he occupied a position of considerable influence in Australian policy making and actions.
It is often easy, simple, or just lazy to seek a black and white ideology from these historical figures in questions such as; "Was Spender a Cold War Warrior?". But for those actually doing the work, ideology is often tempered, if not swamped by, pragmatism. The two big issues in 1950 were Australia's relationship with Asia, and the dual-pronged issue of Soviet Russia and Communist China.
Asia Australian ideological "Realists" (as opposed to the liberal internationalism of the Optimists) wanted the Asian question resolved by European nations returning to their Asian colonies and slowly relinquishing them to self-governance over several generations. Pragmatism intruded quickly, the Indonesians overthrew the Dutch attempts to re-established the Dutch East Indies, Vietnam simmered as a low intensity conflict between the French and Vietnamese nationalists until it opened up as a vein in the Cold War. Spender's thinking on this issue can be found in a cablegram;
Geographically, Australia is next door to Asia and our destiny as a nation is irrevocably conditioned by what takes place in Asia. This means that our future depends to an ever increasing degree upon the political stability of our Asian neighbours, upon the economic well-being of Asian peoples, and upon the development of understanding and friendly relations between Australia and Asia. Whilst it remains true that peace is indivisible and that what takes place in any part of the world may affect us, our vital interests are closer to home. It is therefore in Asia and the Pacific that Australia should make its primary effort in the field of foreign relations.This leadership saw itself expressed in Spender's Colombo Plan. This was the Commonwealth's answer to this issue through a Co-operative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia. Spender took on this issue closely and became the chief architect of it. As negotiations were continuing on the Colombo Plan it became known amongst as the Spender Plan. Despite a long period of gestation before being accepted, it grew to include non-Commonwealth countries with the US joining as a donor in 1951 and Indonesia as a recipient in 1953. The United States The constant dichotomy in Australian foreign policy is Australia's dislike and inability to act in its own interests outside of its relationship with the current superpower. For instance, the Colombo Plan, was a Commonwealth project initially only targeting Commonwealth nations. This fear and paralysis of foreign policy is the Australian political cringe. Spender was not immune to it, like Menzies he sought solace in a relationship with super-powers;
The rising and menacing tide of Communism in the East presents us with a definite threat - and not a remote threat either - to our national existence. But the threat is also a challenge. Australia, who with New Zealand has the greatest direct interest in Asia of all Western peoples, must develop a dynamic policy towards neighbouring Asian countries, whose people we must live with, not only to-day and to-morrow, but for all times. We should give leadership to developments in that area.
This in no way implies a lack of recognition of the extreme importance the Government attaches to our continued intimate association with the British Commonwealth; on the contrary, it reinforces it. It must be made stronger, not weaker, Commonwealth relations themselves strikingly manifest the movement of the world's centre towards the East. Of the eight countries of the Commonwealth, there is not one without vital territorial and strategic interests in either the Pacific or the Indian Ocean. The location of the forthcoming Commonwealth Conference at Colombo reflects the importance attached to this area. This Conference, it is to be hoped, will produce a positive contribution by Commonwealth countries towards securing the peace of the world. And in our deliberations we should not forget - Australia is certainly not likely to do so - how much our security has depended in the past on the friendly and generous assistance of the United States of America. The events of the last war are too close for that. The United States is the greatest Pacific power. Her policy towards Asia is accordingly of supreme importance to Australia's future.Spender recognized early on that the Cold War was an economic one, and that prosperity of Asia was important in deterring communism from moving south. He carried no confidence in the United Nations, and removed that institution from his policies. Spender also wanted a Pacific Pact with the US, one that would become, "Somewhat the same relationship as exists within the British Commonwealth.". This is the Great and Powerful friends doctrine in a nutshell, worthy of Billy Hughes, Robert Menzies and John Curtin. Australia sub-ordinates its foreign policy decision making to the current super-power in return for defence commitments and economic advantages. Nice in theory, but a failure in practice. Super-powers play power politics, and those in the weaker position get railroaded. The 1950s also saw the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) which bound American and European defence and security commitments. There was the desire by Spender to have a similar type of treaty in the Pacific. Spender initially had no success in trying to get Menzies, the British, or the American State Department interested in a Pacific Pact. The opening of hostilities in Korea, and the sudden success of the Chinese invasion through North Korea helped change the level of interest. Spender leapt on the opportunity to show how good an ally Australia could be and quickly committed Australian troops to Korea before Britain could. The next year, US envoy, John Foster Dulles came to Australia to take part in talks that would end up being the ANZUS Treaty. The United States was only six years out from defeating Japan in the Central Pacific and was no facing expansionist policies from both Soviet Russia and China. The concern that there would be another World War which encompassed fronts in Europe, Africa and Asia were quite real. The United State sought to stabilise any possible global conflict by securing a peace treaty with Japan and setting up the terms of involvement with Australia, New Zealand and the Phillipines. The British were initially upset at being left out of the negotiations, and Spender took pains to tell Dulles that despite what was heard from London, Dulles should focus on Australian words and commitment. However, both the United States and Britain saw value in the treaty for stopping what John Curtin had done in 1942. Curtin removed Australian troops in the Middle East, and brought them back to Australia despite the wishes of Churchill and Roosevelt for those troops to remain in the Middle East. This was mirrored in British policy when the British Chief of Staff, Field Marshall John Slim came to Australia in 1951 asking for an Australian commitment to an expeditionary force in the Middle East should their be global conflict with Soviet Russia. Eventually Menzies gave that commitment to Britain. Tussle Australian Prime Ministers have always been strongly involved in foreign policy, often dominating it despite the existence of a foreign minister. Menzies was no exception, he had a strong opinion of what the world should be like. In a short period Percy Spender had negotiated the Colombo Plan and the ANZUS Treaty. Both area's that Menzies was not particularly interested in. Menzies was also concerned that these triumphs from Spender were a challenge to Menzies' leadership. Menzies decided to assert his strength in foreign policy over Spender, mocking him for thinking that a communist threat may come from Asia and that there was the potential for the domino theory to exist. Menzies recommitted Australia to fighting for the civilisation in Europe and Middle East, rather than Asia. Spender's focus on Asia was marginalised in Australian foreign policy. Spender retired from the Menzies Cabinet and took a post as Australia's Ambassador in Washington. It does not appear that he was sacked by Menzies, but it is more likely he did not have the numbers to challenge Menzies for the leadership of the Liberal Party and decided to take a position far away from Canberra. cam
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