Australia has a reputation; it is the Frozen Continent. This name is generally applied in terms of constitutional change. Since Federation, only 8 of 44 referendums have been passed, and 1 of 3 plebiscites
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. Given the glacial rate of turnover in governments, perhaps it is time to consider if the name should also be applied to Australia's electoral process.
Changes in government have slowed dramatically in Australia. In the 103 years since Federation, there have been 16 single party or coalition governments
2
. Nine of these governed in the years before 1932. Of the seven governments since 1932, only Whitlam's did not govern longer than the median duration of all Australian governments
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. Three of these were greater than one standard deviation from the median; the present coalition government is almost certain to make this four barring some catastrophe in the next year.
Governments entrench themselves over the years. The National Party rule in Queensland and the Labor party before them are the grossest examples, but the same problem exists at the Federal level. By my count, eight Federal elections (Fisher in 1910, Cook in 1913, Fisher in 1914, Scullin in 1949, Whitlam in 1972, Hawke in in 1983, and Howard in 1996)
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have effected a change of government. In thirty-three elections we are to assume that the electorate was entirely satisfied with the incumbent, even if the incumbent changed by parliamentary or vice-regal processes between elections.
The implication appears to be that the electorate will vote for whoever is the incumbent - the ultimate in "if it ain't broke, don't fix it". In the period 1929 to 1949 there were seven elections and - in order - a Labor government, Country/United Australia government, and a Labor government. Only one of those elections, the last, effected a change of government (to Menzies). A similar series of governments occurred between 1972 and 1983; five elections, two Governments and only the last election effected a change (back to Labor).
There are two conclusions to be drawn from this. Firstly, Australians are complacent. Secondly, governments use the powers of incumbency to gain an advantage over the Opposition. It is the second of these that I will address. I will look at three aspects of our present system which I believe unbalance elections towards the incumbent and suggest a way to offset the power of incumbency.
Fixed duration of Parliament
Elections in Australia are conducted at the whim of the government, or when the parliament expires three years after its first meeting. The government can dissolve Parliament early in order to seek a mandate on some new policy; or it can dissolve parliament early because it believes the timing is favourable. The Howard government called an early election in 1998 for the former reason, to seek a mandate (or manufacture one depending on your tribal alliance) for a GST. The Fraser government intended to call one in 1982 to defeat Labor before Hawke could wrest the leadership of party from Bill Haydn; the early election of 1983 was still an attempt at favourable timing, but Hawke scraped in just in time, and the Fraser government over read the implications of an earlier by-election.
The ability to seek a mandate does not justify the power that timing elections for favourable moments lends the government - Fraser's failed attempt not withstanding. With parliament lasting only three years, there really is not that much time between elections cycles as is. If a policy is so much of a paradigm shift that a government believes it should seek a mandate to enact it, then it deserves as much discussion as the normal term would allow. Kim Beazely was scathing of claims for a mandate by the Howard government in 1998, pointing out the "unseemly haste" to enact a seismic shift in Australian taxation.
The 1998 campaign highlights the reason why the later power, to pick favourable moments, can be so dangerous. Residents of Australia will no doubt recall the
August 13, 1998 installment of A Current Affair
, devoted to what amounted to a half hour advertisement spot for the government's new tax policy; an election followed seven weeks later. A lot of effort and co-ordination went into that ACA spot, timed to make the perfect lead in to a campaign fought on the GST. On this occasion, the government made its own favourable circumstances.
The power to dissolve parliament at will lends too much advantage to the government and must be taken away. I recommend fixed terms, of three years for the House, and six years for the Senate. This will level the field in terms of favourable circumstances. All of those running for parliament will have equal opportunity to time their message for best effect.
Mandatory Treasury Costings
The Charter of Budgetary Honesty attempts to provide financial information both to the electorate and the opposition during election campaigns, however it is not a success; arguably, it is actually making the public less informed and adversely affecting the Opposition. The Charter's requirements are well-meaning, but fundamentally flawed. There are two requirements of the Charter that directly affect elections: the Pre-election Economic and Fiscal Outlook report, and the costing of spending promises from both parties.
Ross Gittens highlights the flaws in the latter
; the Opposition may have its spending promises costed during the caretaker period of the campaign. On the other hand, the Economic and Fiscal Outlook report is submitted 10 days after the start of campaign. However the Treasurer has full access at all times. This allows the Treasurer to cost spending promises accordingly, but until that report is submitted, the Opposition has only the figures from the last Budget report. Under these circumstances, the Opposition has a choice; they can either have promises costed independently, or they delay big ticket items until after the report is submitted. Neither option is entirely satisfactory and both leave the Opposition in an inferior position.
Experience shows that having promises costed by third parties creates an opportunity for Fear, Uncertainty, and Doubt to be spread by the Government. in the 2004 election, Peter Costello grabbed the media spotlight by claiming to have found a $700 million gap in the costings of Labor's tax policy. It wasn't until the last day of campaigning that Treasury stated that there was no hole, well after the claims had contributed to the government claims of Labor's financial ineptness and far too late for Labor to use it to repair the damage. It seems doubtful the Government have made such a claim if Labor had released the policy months earlier and had it costed by Treasury; that Costello would have staked his reputation on gain-saying the opinion of his own Treasury department.
The unbalancing power here is not that the Government knows more than the Opposition; it is that the government is able to use the Charter to manipulate the media and create an image of the Opposition's spending plans that is not necessarily true. The Charter is flawed and must be altered. Treasury and Finance reporting must be performed more often. Currently, Treasury and Finance table mid-year reports six months after the Budget; make them quarterly instead to ensure a better informed Opposition. Treasury should be available for costings at all times.
Secondly, allow Treasury costings of spending policies by all non-government parties at any time. Allowing costings at any time would short-circuit the government's ability to cast uncertainty and doubt over policies during the election period, a period when the electorate is already inundated with sound bites, politics, and policies. Costings of spending policies should be a routine event, something the public can read and treat as trust-worthy. It should not be a means of partisan points scoring. To that end, I go further than simply making costings available at any time; I propose that it be mandatory that all spending promises, by government or opposition, be costed by Treasury, and that they must be submitted for costings no later than the same day they are released to the public. Treasury must then publicly release an Economic Impact statement within an appropriate time frame - two weeks seems right to me, but I am not an economist and am not aware of how long such a thing would take.
There must be flexibility in the system of course. If a spending promise is submitted for costing before being released to the public it would be inappropriate for Treasury to release the impact statement before the policy is released. Treasury would simply hold onto it. In such situations, an impact statement would have a expiry date ensuring that its details do not become based on out-of-date data when it is finally released.
An Informed Opposition
The concern with mandatory costings is, can we trust Treasury to be impartial? Taking a step out to look at the larger question, do we trust the public service to remain above partisan politics and do their job? This is the other unbalancing power the Government holds; they appoint the holders of powerful positions in the public service. This naturally puts the Government in the position to exert undue influence over the public service.
The public service should be a tool used by the Government to aid in governing Australia; this does not mean that the public service should be monopolised by the Government, nor does it mean that the public service should be at the service of whomever is in Government. The public service must remain impartial. It isn't always so; examples are easy enough to find. Federal Police Commissioner Mick Keelty's back down over statements regarding whether Australia might be more or less of a terrorism target given Australia's involvement in the Iraq war is one recent example.
This influence has a corrosive effect on Australian government when it can be used to mold public opinion and reinforce the power of the party in Government (as opposed to the government of Australia). In order to offset this power, I believe that the way the public service is used must be changed. The Government should retain its monopoly on directing the public service in its activities. But the relative monopoly on access to the public service should be curtailed.
The Shadow Ministry should be given equal access to the public service; not to give directions and set policy, but to observe. Shadow ministers must have access to all information that Government ministers do. Shadow ministers must be able to demand information from the departments relevant to their portfolio. In recent times Opposition senators were able to carry out probing senate investigations of various public service activities, such as the intelligence gathering before the Iraq war and the SIEV-X incident. They did this by an exertion of political power because the Government did not have an outright majority in the Senate. This will now change. With the Government set to gain an outright majority mid-year, public service accountability will be diminished.
The public service has been increasingly politicised over time. Giving the Opposition access to the public service and the right to demand information of it would almost certainly put a stop to this. It is time to shake off the Westminster system view of the Loyal Opposition; it is time for the Opposition itself became a balance against the power of the Government.
None of the three suggestions presented would restrict the government's ability to govern. Only one of them removes a power from the government; a power that it technically doesn't constitutionally have. Instead what the suggestions are intended to achieve is the beginnings of pulling the Australian government away from that vast hack of a system, the Westminster system. The first step should be doing away with the notion of the loyal Opposition, inferior to the Government. And the first step towards that is offsetting the power of incumbency and make the government a little more volatile and a little less stabile.
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- wikipedia.org, Referendums in Australia
- Compilation of data depicting the governments of Australia.
- As of time of writing, there have been 38007 days since the January 1st, 1901 election, the median is 1376.5, and standard deviation is 2198.93.
- Data drawn from wikipedia.org, Prime Ministers of Australia and australianpolitics.com, Australian Federal Election dates
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