There is a definite advantage in being the incumbent. Whether or not it creates the reduced churn Cam has been discussing, the power of incumbency is too great. Measures should be taken to offset some of the power. Three ideas are sketched here.

This started as a comment that got too long; forgive me if it seems too short and not quite fleshed out to be a diary entry.

Perhaps what needs to be done is to identify what gives incumbency so much power, and then offset it. Some steps have been made in that direction; preventing government money being spent to promote the government rather than the policies - even if the border is hazy and the envelope pushed constantly - and Opposition access to Treasury for policy costing purposes are two that come to mind.
  • Treasury costed policies
  • Set term durations
  • Shadow Ministers to have access to departmental information

Treasury costing needs to go further. At present Treasury allots resources for the Opposition to have policies costed. The Opposition doesn't awlays avail themselves of this. It should be made mandatory for both parties. I don't like that the parties hold policies close to their chest until the weeks right before the election. Enforce a rule that only policies fully and transparently costed by Treasury - with all results distributed publicly - may be campaigned on. I don't believe the out-and-out vote buying would occur so much if ad hoc policies couldn't be made on the fly.

The obvious side effect of this is set term durations. The Government must not be in the position to surprise the Opposition and cripple them in an election cycle by not having costed policies to campaign on. The Government must also not be permitted to time elections based on their popularity. Three years, four years; I don't really have an opinion on how long the term should be - although three years would probably be the minimum you'd want - just so long as everyone knows when the election is.

Finally, Government must not have a monopoly on what the public service is doing. Shadow ministers should have access to all information that government ministers do. Shadow ministers should be able to demand information from their relevant department. There has been too much politisiation of the public service, giving the Opposition access to the same information and the right to demand information would almost certainly put a stop to this.
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Cam Riley: South Sea Republic. Freedom, liberty, equity and an Australian Republic.

Comments
  • Alan . # .
    Treasury costings: I could not disagree more with the idea of restricting what parties may campaign on. It is a drastic restriction of free speech, already far more limited in Australia than in other democracies and is far more dangerous to democracy than anything I have ever read on this site or elsewhere.

    Treasury costing should be ended entirely. The Treasury and Finance Department secretaries are appointed by the government, answer to the government and can be sacked by the government. Even if no formal action is taken, the two secretaries would be fools not to be keenly aware that the government controls their careers and the opposition does not. Treasury costing gives only the appearance, without the substance, of an independent check on party proposals.

    There may be a case for an independent board to cost policies but finding ways to guarantee the independence of such a board is almost impossible.
  • cam . # .
    Excellent points: I would add to the third one, open it up to citizen auditors as well. One modern aspect of representative democracy has been the shrinking of the public component, as more and more government activity is shielded in secrecy and hidden from public view.

    The media as the \"supposed\" fourth estate was supposed to be the bridge between the privacy of governments machinations and the people\'s need to make informed democratic decisions. This is not the case anymore. Media managers and political analysts that the parties employ are really there to ensure control over the governments public space.

    It is impossible to make an informed decision anymore, if there ever was. Consequently we have celebrity elections that are not much different from \"American Idol\". I would like to see citizen auditors get in there and shake government up. Make government a public space, like a republican government should be, rather than the process of bastard sons of Machiavallien Princes we have now.

    cam
  • avocadia . # .
    Free Speech:

    There\'s a difference between \"We believe that every Australian should have access to hospital care immediately, no waiting lists\" and \"We\'re going to dump twenty billion dollars into getting rid of hospital waiting lists. What was that? Funding?\" Campaign away on any issue they want, but allowing promises of money spent that hasn\'t been costed is deceitful; deceitfulness on the part of our leaders undermines the very point in having an election. We cannot make an informed decision unless we know for sure if they can come through with the money.

    I reckon Paul Keating and Bob Hawke may be able to tell you some very interesting stories from the late eighties on exactly how complicit Treasury can be to the wishes of the Government. It wasn\'t Hawke and Keating raising the interest rates as Australia moved into recession. Even if Treasury officials are affected by political  considerations, allowing the Shadow Finance minister and Shadow Treasurer to question the Finance and Treasury departments would almost certainly reveal it.  
  • Alan . # .
    Treasury costings: You\'re giving unelected bureaucrats beholden to government the power to veto the subject of election campaigns. I really cannot imagine anything more guaranteed to increase the advantages of incumbency. Allowing a party to campaign on a topic is pointless if there\'s an allegedly impartial certificate to the effect that the program cannot be funded. At the last election the Treasury findings were simply disregarded by government when convenient.

    The whole costing process gives a entirely false picture to the electorate already. Empowering it further by giving Treasury an actual veto on opposition policy will only exacerbate the problem.
  • avocadia . # .
    What veto?:

    There is no veto power in Treasury costing the monies promised by a party policy. It is simple statement of the informed opinion of the people we otherwise trust with the most comprehensive control over the Australian economy. We should be able to look at a policy and know how much it will cost. That the Government disregarded the findings when it suited them during the last election merely highlights that there is a problem here; there is no reliable, impartial measure of policy costs.

    As for questions of their integrity, I think you are gravely underestimating these people. This is a group of people who it is routinely accepted have more influence over the Australian economy than any Treasurer or Prime Minister can hope to have. If we can\'t trust these people to give an impartial opinion of the actual costs of promises given by both parties, Australia is in a whole lot more trouble than simple political incumbency.
  • cam . # .
    Another means: Would be to set up an ICAC like independent commission to study and audit government. Kind of like a fiscal corruption organisation, that outside of a Minister\'s portfolio. An \"Independent Commission for Fiscal Accountability\". A bit like the GAO in the US, but more independent.

    Personally I reckon let the citizens have a go at it, allow spontaneous groups of citizen auditors to audit the processes and future proposals of government, they will call \"uncle\" or \"shananigans\" pretty quick. Through statistical weight of numbers, they will also flatten the partisanship as well.

    cam
  • Alan . # .
    Treasury veto: Enforce a rule that only policies fully and transparently costed by Treasury - with all results distributed publicly - may be campaigned on.

    I\'m sorry, but it\'s hard to read the head post in this thread and not interpret it as a Treasury veto on what a party may advocate. The proposal is contrary to the freedom of political communication enforced by the High Court. There are certainly problems with late release of polices, but a rule about what parties may campaign is, even if it were constitutional, not the answer.

    Ross Gittins argues that the existing Charter of Budget Honesty distorts camapigns in favour of the government. Why advantage the government further?
  • avocadia . # .
    No Treasury veto:

    I find it hard to find how you can read a veto in that. Treasury has to tell us how much it costs. Where is the veto in that?

    On the whole though, you\'re probably right about one thing. I\'d drop the requirement that policies be submitted before the election begins. I\'d simply make Treasury costings mandatory and that policies be submitted to Treasury for costings as soon as (same day) they are made public.

    The costings process could be made both more even-handed and more informative to voters if both sides agreed that shadow ministers be permitted to discuss their policies (but not, of course, the Government\'s policies) in confidence with the department heads.
    Ross Gittins

    Nice to see I wasn\'t the only one to think so. As he points out, just about every point Gittins makes would be offset if the Opposition had just as much communication with Treasury as the Government does.
  • Alan . # .
    veto rule: Your language speaks about what a party may campaign on. \'may\' is about permission. It is incompatible with the freedom of political communication. In a democracy a party can campaign on the proposition that the moon is made of green cheese and it\'s up to the other parties and the media to critique that proposition.

    Setting up an agency to cost election promises (with or without an actual veto) merely privileges one set of policies over another. Government promises are always well costed, as Gittins says, because the Treasury and Finance Departments cost them. Opposition promises are not well costed, as Gittins also says, because the opposition has no access to the Treasury and Finance bureaucracies.

    Giving the opposition equal access to the bureaucracy may seem to be a distinct improvement on what happens now, but has its own dangers. If you will recall Mark Latham accepted a briefing on Iraq to his own considerable political peril. In economics, where everything is a matter of judgment, a shadow treasurer would be foolish to accept Treasury briefings that could then be used against him.