Sea of Sands covers Senator Hill's comment
that a new Defence White Paper was not necessary. The Defence White Paper from 2000 covers Australian strategic doctrine and serves as the basis for capability, readiness, procurement and deployment. The previous white paper was before the terrorist attacks on America in 2001. Since then the United States has chosen to pursue terrorism as a military objective - and Australia has joined them in this. We now have several years experience in combating terrorism from a military point of view, what can be learnt from it, and should we reassess our doctrine in a 2005 Defence White Paper?
Senator Hill
Senator Hill
is the Minister for Defence. In a
recent interview
he was asked,
"Why do we need a new defence white paper?"
He doesn't answer the question but claims that the 2000 white paper and documents based off of it remain relevant;
Because I think that the 2000 paper is still fundamentally sound, I think it's been updated in 2003 with greater focus been given to WMD and global terrorism and as I said to some internal issues of nation buildings within our own regions. The DCP the Defence Capability Plan was written pursuant to that white paper and refined pursuant to the update. I think it addresses the strategic environment as we find it and I don't think the distraction of going back into another sort of intellectual debate will actually contribute to the better practical outcomes, I think our challenge at the moment is to deliver on the white paper and not to be distracted from that task.One aspect of not having the process for a new white paper initiated is that it removes debate away from the public and allows the government to act with impunity in that area. I dislike his use of the word distraction. If the people want to debate this, then they should. Distraction for whom? I think it is political-speak for avoiding accountability and public scrutiny of policy. Australian defence doctrine for the Howard government is based upon; 2000 Defence White Paper This document recognises globalisation and US strategic primacy as the strongest shapers of the international strategic environment. The paper states that;
These [two] factors will help strengthen global security and promote economic, social and political developments that align with Australia's interests and values.The White Paper also claims that Australia is a secure country, courtesy of our geo-political isolation, our good relations with our neighbours and being in a relatively benign region that has a low probability of conflict. It also states our strong alliance with the US is another reason for our security. The document also notes that there has been an arms race on in South-East Asia, of which Australia has contributed to with its procurements. It states that our primary interest remains protecting Australia and it direct approaches - the air-sea gap - but the document makes many tips of the hat to multi-lateral expeditions. The military strategy is the weakest part of the white paper, and where the government has not delivered on its promises in 2000. The paper claims three principles in military strategy;
- self-reliance : Being able to defend Australia without relying on the combat forces of other countries.
- maritime strategy : Controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia. These are the North-West shelf, the Timor Sea and the Coral Sea.
- proactive operations : The ability to strike hostile forces far from the Australian shore.
But for the past 50 years ANZUS has given the [Au-US alliance] relationship shape, depth and weight. The Treaty remains today the foundation of a relationship that is one of our great national assets.Howard enacted the treaty after the September 11th attacks - partly to keep this out of date Cold War document relevant. This document is the fiction that the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine is founded on. it is not a basis for a foreign policy, nor a military policy. 2003 Defence Update The 2003 paper is an effort to update the 2000 White Paper to take into account the changes in the strategic environment since the 2001/2002 terrorist attacks. the foreward claims;
What is already clear is that while the Defence White Paper focused on the development of capabilities for the Defence of Australia and its National Interests, two matters - terrorism and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD], including to terrorists - have emerged to new prominence and create renewed strategic uncertainty. In addition, some adverse trends in our immediate neighbourhood have continued.There are two issues there. Terrorism and WMDs. Firstly, the United States chose to pursue terrorism as a military issue. They invaded Afghanistan, then set-up a deceitful campaign to justify the invasion of Iraq. The capture of suspected terrorists has led to the United States detaining suspects as "enemy-combatants", outside of civil law and under military legal systems and process. There is no doubt the US is seeking a military solution to terrorism. Is this justified? In my opinion no. Terrorism remains a civil issue. For Australia it is actually a foreign policy issue. Indonesia has been taking the punches of terrorism aimed at Australia. Indonesia has been handling it admirably - catching the terrorists and bringing them to justice in civil courts of law. By comparison the American military has not been able to bring Osama Bin Laden to justice yet. The failure for Australian politicians has been the reliance on the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy. It has left us with a weakened Prime Minister who can do nothing other than offer uncritical support for the United States and its military pursuit of terrorism. The other premise of this report is the Weapons of Mass Destruction. This has become a vogue term since President Bush used at is the fulcrum spin in his deceitful campaign to justify the invasion of Iraq. It is a fear based term - designed to linguistically evoke horror in the population. We have had threats from technological weapons at the individual level (non nation-state) - nuclear, biological etc right through the cold war. I do not believe this is a new issue. This is political fashion and a consequence of "fear and feel-good" politics. 2003 Strategic Environment The 2003 document makes the point that the posture the United States has taken against terrorism has inflamed anti-Americanism, not just in Muslim states. The strength of the United States and the defeat of Communism has made the defence relationships between major-states more secure. But the areas of the North Pacific and the Middle East - which are important economic regions for Australia - are more volatile than in 2000. The 2003 document also aligns Australian military expeditionary doctrine with American strategy. For instance the Afghanistan invasion is described as;
The changed strategic and security environment requires responses from a number of government agencies.
The important role of military force in the War on Terror has been demonstrated in Afghanistan. The removal of the Taliban regime - Al Qaida's host - has eliminated one of the world's most oppressive governments and given the people of Afghanistan the chance of a better future. Information gained has added to our understanding of terrorist networks and disrupted planned attacks. Importantly, Al Qaida has lost its unhindered access to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. But actions in disrupting Al Qaida's operations in Afghanistan are just the first step. Much remains to be done and some further resort to military force is likely to be needed.This does not explain the invasion in terms of a nation-state refusing to turn over a suspected terrorist responsible for the September 11th attacks. Australian doctrine describes it as removing a regime and bringing a future to a nation. With this Australia is saying that it supports a military solution - not civil justice for perpetrators of crimes. Yet in contradiction, we have the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which is the basis of civil pursuit of terrorism regionally. Australia played a prominent role in this, and it has been successful in keeping terrorism down regionally. The MOU is also more closely aligned with Australian values. The only conclusion that can be reached is that we would be pursing this same policy in the Middle East, except for our uncritical support of America. Further examples that Australia sees terrorism as requiring a military solution is the expansion of the Special Forces, the establishment of a Special Operations Command and creating a Tactical Assault Group. In the case of a terrorist attack on Australia, it will be the military stepping in, not the State Police Forces. I think this is a gross misuse of federal power. The civil authorities at the state level should be the ones establishing the knowledge, skills and readiness for this. This is another example of the over-reach of federal power. 2003 Update Conclusion The 2003 Update is a pretty weak document. It justifies the Missile Defence project with North Korea and Iraq's WMDs. The latter was false and North Korea still does not have the capability to achieve Australia with missiles, despite Downer's claim to the contrary. The paper also makes the distinction that it supports a military solution to terrorism at home and abroad, except in South-East Asia, where it will pursue a civil multi-lateral course. At home the Special Operations Command and Tactical Assault Group point to the federal government deploying the military domestically if there is a terrorist attack on Australian soil. There is no mention of changes in procurement for the ADF, there is also no mention of any changes in Infantry readiness and sustainability with the deployments (in 2003) of the ADF on expeditions. A constant warning cry has been that the Army needs more diggers to meet the deployments being asked of them by the Howard government. This was not addressed. Also not addressed were the Air Warfare Destroyers and whether they have any role in a strategic doctrine that is dominated by sustained expeditions. The logistical issues with sustained multinational deployments are also not mentioned. The Howard government has been in power for over eight years now, and has constantly deployed the ADF in an expeditionary mode, but so far has failed to address Australia's airlift capability and its brown-blue water logistical capability. Defence Capability Plan The Defence Capability Plan (DCP) represents an updating of the Defence Capability Plan outlined in the 2000 White Paper and now represents the capital investment from 2004 through to 2014. The DCP lists a large number of projects and phases of upgrades to existing platforms as well as the procurement of new platforms. The DCP divides the project responsibilities into;
- Aerospace (AIR)
- Maritime (SEA)
- Vehicles and Land (LAND)
- Weapons and Munitions
- Electronic Systems
- AIR5418 - Air-to-Surface long range stand off missile capability for the F18 and P3C Orion. (350M-450M)
- AIR6000 - The JSF project. (11.5B-15.5B)
- AIR7000 - P3C replacement possibility project with potential for MUAV as maritime patrol. (750M-1B)
- JP90 - Updating the combat identification system. (150M-200M)
- JP126 - Reassessment of logistical needs from expeditionary deployment pressures. (150M-200M)
- JP2044 - Space based surveillance capability. (50M-75M)
- JP2069 - High grade cryptographic equipment.
- JP5408 - GPS enhancement and risk study.
- LAND112 - ASLAV Enhancement. (200M-250M)
- LAND907 - Battle tank replacement. This is the RFP that got the Abrams in the door.(450M-600M)
- SEA1439 - Collins improvement program. (600M-800M)
- SEA4000 - Air Warfare Destroyer
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