When I was up in Newcastle, I often listened to Karl Kruszelnicki's science show on JJJ . He is an obviously intelligent and knowledgeable man, who doesn't suffer from the arrogance that often comes with it. One of the features of his show was the ease by which he admitted he didn't know, and would either go off to research it so he had the answer next week; or people would ring in with the answer to the question which stumped him. I recall Karl saying once on the radio, after someone calling in helped him, "There is much wisdom in people".

The Federal and State governments are populated by professional politicians who are become more and more entrenched each year. They are managing the media in such a way, that they can make decisions with impunity, and only have to take notice of the electorate in a short period prior to elections. This is leaving us with inferior outcomes. Our government institutions lack vitality, vigour and relevance. This can be amended partly by greater participation of non-professional politicians in the government process. Basically tapping the profound wisdom that, as Karl commented, can be found in the people.

Non-elected Cabinet Ministers

The Imagining Australia folks in their book have a section on expanding eligibility for the Executive Cabinet. In the Westminster system the formal power of the Executive is spread across the Executive and Legislative. By the Constitution, the Executive is the Queen of England. Her representative in Australia is the Governor-General, who is constitutionally guided by Parliament.

The Governor-General heads the Executive Council. This contains the Governor-General and the Executive Cabinet. The Executive Cabinet is a collection of the Prime Minister and other Senior Ministers, such as the Treasurer, Foreign Minister, etc. The Prime Minister heads the Executive Cabinet and by convention guides the Governor-General. The real power of the executive lies in the hands of the Prime Minister, no matter how ambiguous and obtuse the Australian Constitution is in this area.

The Imagining Australia folks call Australian Government, "responsible cabinet government". Built as it is on the British tradition of responsible government. Even though self-government has survived in Australia since the 1850s to provide a relatively stable political structure, the Imagining Australia folks ask if it can be improved. They see one area of improvement being in opening up the Executive Cabinet to non-elected appointees.

There are two issues surrounding this. The Prime Minister through the wielding of absolute party discipline has become the dominant member in parliament, and has warped the cabinet system to a presidential style of singular executive. Another issue is that those that make up the numbers of the cabinet are often professional politicians with little experience of private industry, or of a non-political speciality. For instance, John Howard was last in private industry in 1974. Since then, a total of thirty-two years, he has been a professional politician.

The Imagining Australia folks write;

We propose broadening the pool from which ministers can be drawn. The prime minister should be able to appoint Cabinet ministers from outside of parliament. Any Australian with the appropriate expertise and experience should be eligible. These people need not be experts - after all, policy experts are often best situated in the public service. Rather they could simply be individuals who have been successful in relevant fields and who, by virtue of their political and managerial skills, would excel in a ministerial role.

As the authors note, it is not a radical idea. The US Executive Cabinet is entirely composed of appointments, rather than elected officials. The President and Vice-President are the only ones elected in the US cabinet. The danger in this system is that individuals who have been rejected in an election will still get appointed into powerful positions. A good example of this is former US Attorney-General John Ashcroft. He failed to win election in Mississippi, yet was appointed into a senior position in the cabinet despite being rejected by voters as unfit for public office.

Another issue that is not covered in the Imagining Australia book, is how the appointments would be approved. In the US system the Senate approves the Presidents appointments. This often means that those who appear unfit for an appointment are closely scrutinized. For instance Alberto Gonzalez, who had given legal opinion on Guantanamo Bay and the practices that were condoned there. Another is the current appointment of John Bolton. It would be in the interests of separation of powers that the Prime Minister puts any outside appointments to the Executive Cabinet through the Senate first, where they can be approved or rejected.

The Imagining Australia folks write;

Such people [those that may be suitable for an appointment to cabinet] could inject new life and ideas into policy-making, informed by sustained practical engagement with particular issues. In a nation of just 20 million people, governments should draw on talent from all walks of life - and should aim to produce a Cabinet that is representative of Australia in all its diversity.

While that is a nice sentiment, nowhere in their book do the Imagining Australia folks seek to draw on anything but specialists. The Imagining Australia book follows closely a doctrine of increasing the number of non-elected specialists into Australian government, economy, policy and culture - with a decreased level of accountability to the public. This is the weakness of the book in my opinion.

However I am comfortable with appointed cabinet ministers as long as the appointments are known well in advance of an election, and that they have to be approved by the Senate - and maybe Ratifiers and a People's Chamber too.

A People's Cabinet

Nicholas Gruen in a recent post to troppo armadillo, advocated a People's Chamber . Nicholas based it upon the shallowness, and homogeneity of political culture - the same base from which the Imagining Australia folks worked from in proposing appointed Cabinet members. In proposing a People's Chamber Nicholas instead saw inspiration in the original democracy itself, Athens . Athenian democracy incorporated aspects of sortition and direct democracy. Sortition is the process whereby officials are chosen through lottery, rather than election or appointment. Unlike post-enlightenment democracy, the Athenian model did not incorporate the principle of separation of powers, nor universal franchise.

The People's Chamber would be a third house in the parliamentary system. One where its representative would be chosen by sortition from the population to participate in government. The chamber would be approximately one hundred people. From a later thread, Ken Parish tentatively agreed with the principle once he determined it didn't require physical presence in Canberra to be effective. It should be noted Nicholas made no determination on any requirements in the physical presence of the chamber in his post, or subsequent comments, but Ken thought small periods of face to face meeting for the chamber were acceptable;

Maybe it could work if the People's House met for (say) 3 or 4 fortnight blocks each year. Any more than that and too many people would be precluded from membership, not only people in my position but single parents, most small businesspeople (including trades), and anyone who is still carving out a career where 3 years absence would adversely impact promotion prospects. That sort of length of time ought to be enough to work, although any shorter wouldn't. And I guess you could turn over the membership every year rather than every 3 years.

The important aspect of this proposal is that there is wider recognition that there is no legitimate voice of the people despite Australia's reliance on proportional voting. Pluralism has largely been destroyed by the parties, absolute party discipline and professional politicians.

Citizen's Representatives and Citizens Auditors

Scrymarch in the past has proposed sortitionists being injected directly into parliament. Chosen by lottery, and serving alongside elected politicians to be involved in forming government, opposition and independents. I cannot find a link for it, as much of Scrymarch's political philosophy is spread across comments rather than articles, but IIRC a considerable percentage was proposed - in the order of twenty-five percent.

Again this was to inject the people directly into the process and take advantage of their wisdom, ability to excel, and their non-political experiences while they are fresh. From a comment ;

I like indirect democracy, and community representatives; but the current mob are not representative. Which is where sortition and ratification comes in. Sortition puts people representative of the population in Parliament. Ratification ensures the consensus reality of the parliamentary village does not become too detached from the people. I see the process of ratification as a final referee, similar to a presidential veto, but with a clearer and less factional mandate.

I think the pace and detail of legislation is inherently too great to be sensibly weighed by a large electorate. Some delegation is required, by sheer division of labour. Mencius made the same point 2300 years ago.

Direct democracy mechanisms can be used well. The Swiss use Citizen Initiated Referenda to great effect. I'm a fan of that system. But the Swiss are pretty civic minded, and that takes time to cultivate. The number of proposals are also an order of magnitude less than legislation.

Another proposal of Scrymarch's was Citizen Auditors. These are spontaneous citizen groups which rise up to audit government - a kind of flash-mob for government auditing. I think this would bring superior solutions, not in government waste, but in identifying expensive, ineffective and impractical policy - which ultimately has to be funded to be implemented. This would definitely take advantage of the wisdom and application of the people and in my opinion would bring some of the fastest returns and improvements.

This proposal would require supporting legislation, which I doubt parliament would implement - government prefers acting privately and avoiding the public space as much as possible. This is also used to avoid criticism. Given the slow oscillication of the Australian system in the change over of government, the incumbent needs to be exposed to more pressure and criticism so that they take responsibility for their actions.

A Ratification Model

In an article titled, "The Fourth Estate" , I proposed a ratification model of parliament for an Australian Republic. In this model the Ratifiers exist mainly to kill repugnant legislation and bills that are not in the public interest. A good example of this would be the US Patriot Act, or Copyright extensions and DMCA like clauses that came with the Au-US FTA.

The Ratifiers would be a flash-mob chosen by sortition for each bill that passes the Senate. They are like jurors for legislation, and only exist for a single bill, in the same way jurors only exist as a group for one case before disbanding. Each group of Ratifiers will consist of approximately one percent of the population. I wrote;

The Ratifiers;

  • will have its members chosen by sortition.
  • will consist of at least 1% of the population to vote on a bill or a judicial nominee.
  • will not be allowed to excuse themselves from the process, however an abstinence will be counted as no.
  • will require a greater than 50% no vote on a bill to send it back to the Senate.

Note that the Ratifiers are intended to be anonymous - a secret ballot for each bill. They are also not intended to meet face to face, nor to offer policy suggestions as Ratifiers on a bill. Though they may comment as citizens or affected individuals as part of the normal political discourse. I constantly write on the inability of Australian Government to adhere to legislation that respects our rights and liberties. This would address that issue.

Conclusion

The above article contains four different innovations on the parliamentary model, but all come from the same standpoint; tapping the profound wisdom of the people, and the knowledge that the people know what is best for them - consequently injecting them directly into the political process will only benefit the country above and beyond the current system.

cam
Cam Riley: South Sea Republic. Freedom, liberty, equity and an Australian Republic.

Comments

  • siento . # .
    Non elected cabinets are a bad idea: President Bush would never become Prime Minister in Australia because he would never be able to handle question time and the thorough debate of a parliamentary system.

    Indeed, where the US a parliamentary system now there would be a barrage of questions about the fudging of intelligence. In the US system no one ever has to answer questions. The press can be dodged easily enough. It is worth noting that in the UK which has a similar system to Australia the issue is not dying.

    Similarly, it is important that ministers have to answer questions from people in parliament. The people in parliament have the time and resources to properly think up questions and they can force some kind of response from the person they are questioning.

    Parties are an annoying fact. But to say that:

    The important aspect of this proposal is that there is wider recognition that there is no legitimate voice of the people despite Australia\'s reliance on proportional voting. Pluralism has largely been destroyed by the parties, absolute party discipline and professional politicians.

    is overstating the case. There is a lack of absolute party discipline in Australia that is shown by the very next article in which the results of insubordination by Liberal party members is discussed.

    There are problems with parties and professional politicians. Today most Australian politicians are lawyers or teachers. There are essentially no scientists or engineers in parliament.
  • Absolute party discipline: It\'s not newsworthy in other countries that members of a party don\'t agree with all the party\'s policies. I think you overstate those four backbenchers.
  • cam . # .
    Question Time: is a good point with appointed officials, I sent an email to the Imagining Australia folks inquiring how they would deal with approval of appointments and the accountability of the appointed officials. (ie Question Time or Senate hearing/committees as in the US)

    I think the Migration Detention Amendment shows the absolute power of the Prime Minister. That some back benchers introduced a private member bill is quite extraordinary these days. That their bill got cut down to nothing after the PM got a hold of them and it, shows where the power is.

    The amendment gives more arbitrary power to the Executive Cabinet, and no-compelling adherence to process or accountability. It is legislation designed to shut the media up, and appease the public without the government actually having to do anything, or change any of their policies.

    I was also reading through the Senate Hansard last night and the valedictorian speeches. Several of them spoke that the Senate wasnt subject to absolute party discipline, but I suspect their definition of absolute is different to mine, as I am not seeing it.

    cam
  • Accountability: A quick note on the question of democratic accountability. In \"Imagining Australia\" in the section on reform of cabinet government we make a point of emphasizing the importance of ministers being democratically accountable. On page 71 we suggest that \"To achieve this, externally appointed ministers would sit on the front-bench during Question Time (side by side with their parliamentary colleagues) and be required to attend parliamentary inquiries and Senate committees. And they--- like all other ministers---would serve at the will of the prime minister\".
  • cam . # .
    Sorry. Missed that in the book.: I had it open on that page while I was writing the article. Doh.

    What about the appointment process, what check and balance is there to stop repugnant, incompetent or nepotist appointments being made?

    cam
  • avocadia . # .
    Appointments:

    The Senate. Only this time, we use clear, explicit language outlining the role of the Senate in approving appointments and then we use oune of those highlighter pens to draw the readers attention to it.

    Possibly also make it part of the daily proceedings of the House of Reps. Every morning the Government has to stand up en masse and recite, "Verily, the Senate shall approve appointments and we shall not play funny buggers by claiming mandates to ignore the Constitution"
  • cam . # .
    Senate would be the logical place: .... to have the appointments confirmed. Though it would be great to have sortitionists or ratifiers have a vote on it too. Can you imagine the Mississipi ratifiers response if they got to vote on Ashcroft so soon after rejecting him for the Senate.

    NO! NO! NO!

    cam
  • avocadia . # .
    Ratifiers:

    Well, there you go with a issue that might break on state lines rather than party. You\'d hope/expect the Mississipi senators to vote down Ashcroft. I\'ve no idea if they did or not - my suspicion is that they voted on party lines - but then you\'d hope that they were punished for it at an election.

    I think the point I was thinking of when I started typing was that there is a point where you have to trust those you elect to do their job, and if they aren\'t then you have to do the job of punishing them at the election.
  • cam . # .
    btw I have probably flip-flopped on this issue: As recently as Dec 2003 I wrote ;

    I agree with Costello, the members of the Cabinet will have to be drawn from an elected body of officials. This means the Cabinet will need to be formed from members of the Legislative.

    cam
  • avocadia . # .
    That\'s not flipflopping: You merely broadened the universe of discourse :- )
  • I have a political philosophy now?: That comment\'s a fair sample of my thoughts on sortition, and I also wrote an article on for k5 two years back that still has some good links, particularly Knag\'s Let\'s Toss For It .  There\'s also the Sortition (Lottery) pattern from my occassional project Government Design Patterns .

    Ratifiers are probably the culturally easiest to bolt on to the current systems in rich world democracies, because it\'s so similar to voting.  This is a little strange considering it\'s the only method that requires tech greater than that available in ancient Athens.  Citizen Auditors are also pretty easy to add, this is all ignoring the inevitable resistance from the rent-seekers and courtesans currently gracing our palaces of democracy.

    For the more aggressive methods of sortition like appointing members of parliament, I think you\'d need different techniques in different places.  I\'m not really a fan of adding a third house of parliament appointed by lottery, but in places like Queensland, Britain or Canada, with non-existent or uselss upper houses, I would happily appoint up to a half of the members by lot.  (The remainder would probably be a mix of archived party appointees, the great and good etc.)

    Where the house of review is a major house of parliament, like the US where it\'s the primary house, or Australia where it can be a serious brake on the government, I\'d be reluctant to put members appointed by lot in balance of power positions.  The aim is representation and relevance, and this is better achieved by placing the members in the secondary house, in these cases the House of Reps.  I\'d start with a dozen members or so, but you could ramp it up to a quarter of the house as long as you excluded their ability to vote on money bills, which is more happily the business of the executive of the day.