Australia was reliant upon the British Foreign Office for its foreign policy until the Department of External Affairs grew in cabinet importance in the 1940s. Previously the department had not been focused on foreign policy at all. Central to the department's new importance in foreign affairs was the changing circumstance of the Cold War, the decolonisation of former European Empires and the loss of power and prestige of Britain. Another reason, was the vibrant energy of Herbert Vere "Doc" Evatt.

The path to an independent foreign affairs department was not simple, other cabinet heavyweights such as defence, trade, immigration and even the Prime Minister were keen to protect their bureaucratic turf and existing power. There was also the question of competing philosophies on foreign policy - the advent of the United Nations and Soviet aggression was to bring those philosophies into sharp focus.

Doc Evatt

Evatt was born in Maitland, NSW in 1894. Law was to become a focus of his early career, as he graduate first with Bachelors, and then with a Doctorate in law from Sydney University. Soon after he was elected to the NSW Legislative Assembly before being appointed, at age thirty-six, as the youngest justice to serve in the High Court of Australia. He retired from that position to run for the Federal seat of Barton in 1940 and soon found himself as Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs in the Curtin Government.

Previous to Evatt taking over External Affairs, there was no real department for foreign policy, nor foreign affairs. Australia was the last dominion to let go of Britain as its guiding light in foreign policy, and as a consequence the Prime Minister had a great deal of influence in this area. The Prime Minister appointed the Australian High Commissioner to London, who was responsible to the Prime Minister, and not the Department of External Affairs.

This power structure between the Prime Minister and the "Great and Powerful Friend" was to be disastrous when Curtin acted toward American General Douglas MacArthur in the same way, giving MacArthur constant access to Curtin, and Curtin not involving the Australian military in any of the decisions.

The Cold War

For a new foreign affairs department, the challenges in the aftermath of World War II were large. The traditional Western European powers had been either defeated, or bankrupted. Their power and influence was at an end. The European empires had colonies around the world and many near Australia. The Dutch with Indonesia, the Portuguese with East Timor, the British with Malaya, the French with Vietnam and New Caledonia; the stability of all these colonies was in doubt.

The Department of External Affairs did not doubt that the European powers would retreat from their colonies, but there were several unknowns. Were the colonies capable of self-governance now, would the European powers let them self-govern if they were, and would it take generations until European power was finally spent. There was the additional irony that Australia was firmly wedded to a British Empire, that had retracted heavily during World War II.

Another new power relationship had emerged, and that was the United States and Soviet Russia. The United States was predicated on free markets and the open movement of capital, whereas the Soviet Union was defined by a centrally controlled economy and regulated to the minutest input and output. The Cold War was to become an economic war, but in 1946, there remained the apprehension that it would become another war of aggression which would reach every corner of the globe.

Another dynamic which came to the fore after World War II was the theme of global governance, which after the San Francisco conference, was to become the United Nations. The body was set up to create new ways for nation-states to interact and communicate outside of "power politics" which many saw as being the cause for two World Wars in the space of thirty years.

Optimists and Realists

Frederick Eggleston lectured future diplomats for the Department of External Affairs and categorized his students into two camps; Optimists and Realists. Eggleston called the Optimists those that were liberal internationalists. They saw peace as the normal state of international affairs and war as the anomaly. Consequently they sought meta-national structures which promoted the communication between potential conflicting nations, and the dismantling of irrational power bases; such as empires, colonialism, dictatorships, despots, and arms races. In addition they sought universal human rights.

The Realists by comparison were still wedded to the "power politics" that had dominated Western Europe for centuries. In Australia's case this meant following the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy, seeking an iron-tight alliance with the great power of the time, the United States. The Realists also saw the Cold War in binary and absolutist terms, there would be no empathising with the Soviet Union. Power was respected for its own means, and if a dictatorship or despot was part of the alliance, then their crimes against liberty were to be over-looked. The Realists also believed that the European powers should return to their colonies and grant them self-government over several generations, rather than immediately.

Both camps looked to an external body of higher coercion to implement their international goals however. The Optimists in the United Nations, and the Realists in the United States. Neither philosophy truly had an independent Australian foreign policy at heart. It is interesting to note that at the end of World War II, Australia had the fourth largest Air Force on the planet after the United States, Russia and Britain. Yet the Realists were prepared to see that instrument of power go, and a reliance on American military power replace it. There is no doubt, despite their efforts, that neither the Optimists, nor the Realists, saw Australia in terms of an independent country.

Defence and Immigration

The Defence Department in the 1940s was extremely conservative. Those that sought an independent Australian military with the short funds that it could muster in the 1930s were ultimately ousted. The great pro-Australian Air-Marshal Richard Williams was removed by Robert Menzies in a political move. Yet it was Williams' foresight to establish an Australian aerospace industry, with the intent of making the RAAF an indigenously sustainable force, that enabled Australia to license build aircraft until the 1980s.

Evatt and his secretary, John Burton, thought the military leaders too wedded to British ways, and "inadequately Australian". Not only were the defence department concerned about the growing influence of the Department of External Affairs, but there now arose the challenge of Australian military doctrine having to fit a foreign policy that wasn't dictated by Britain. Previously the military only had to worry about transparently slotting in to the British military and ensuring suitable numbers of Australian troops were available for a Middle Eastern theatre.

It is with complete irony that ANZUS is used as such a crutch by modern Australian Governments. The ANZUS Treaty was established by John Foster-Dulles with the urging of Britain so that Australia would send troops to the Middle East in any future war. The treaty was written so that the United States would ensure Australian sovereignty in the Pacific in the case of a second front arising, so that Australia would not do what it did in 1941 and attempt to bring them home, or even worse, defy London and Washington and demand they be employed in the defence of Australia. The ANZUS Treaty was so Australia would not do a "Curtin" with the 7th Division again.

In the 1940s Australia suffered from the White Australia Policy with Arthur Calwell enforced as the Minister for Immigration. The Department of External Affairs wanted to establish strong ties with the newly emerging and developing Asian nations in Australia's region, but many actions of Calwell angered the Asian nations, making diplomacy a difficult exercise.

A Loud Voice And A Small Stick

Australia has often been accused of braying loudly but carrying a small stick. Evatt saw the possibility of the United Nations as enabling a middle power such as Australia to have undue influence on the major powers. This is the core of the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine. It is predicated on subservience to the current super-power but seeking to advance Australia's national interests, security and economic, within the interests of the super-power. Evatt saw subservience to the UN as offering the possibility to influence multiple powers at once, including the US, UK, France and the Soviet Union. It was as mis-guided as the current bilateral relationship with the US, and doomed to fail. Power politics dominated in the UN as well.

Evatt and Burton both saw secrecy as hampering foreign relations. They were open in their communications with anyone who wanted to communicate, including communist nations. They were also often exceedingly blunt with other nations, and did not use the garrulous forms of diplomatic language to explain themselves. However their approach did mean that the world knew Australia now had a Department of Foreign Affairs that dealt in foreign policy.

Conclusion

At the end of Evatt's term as Minister for External Affairs, the department remained in the maturation stage even though it had achieved prominence in the Executive Cabinet. Despite the categorization of diplomats by Egglestone, the Department's outlook was grey and often pragmatic, dealing as Optimists when they could and Realists when they could not. Evatt is well known for his role in establishing the United Nations, but Australian foreign policy remained trapped by alliance diplomacy, that would lead to the uncritical support of the United States over the next half-century and continue through today.

cam
Cam Riley: South Sea Republic. Freedom, liberty, equity and an Australian Republic.

Comments

  • siento . # .
    The US alliance: Nice article, it\'s interesting to think about the short history of Australia\'s foreign service and independent foreign relations.

    The question is what does Australia get out of the US alliance and is this enough? Arguably we get security, but that requires believing that someone is actually out to get us in the first place. We do also get things like free trade agreements which are hopefully of use.

    Also, Australia culturally is part of the Anglo-sphere, and unless we all start reading other languages our ideas and policy are going to be influenced strongly from other English speaking countries.

    Really, Australia is highly unlikely to be doing things any other way.

    The other thing to consider was that during the Cold War there was a genuinely menacing enemy (as opposed to the current imagined one) in charge of a country that was expansionist and that had an ideaology that was, quite literally, deadly.

    The Cold War only ended 15 years ago. Since the Cold War there has been only occasion on which Australia has been asked to participate in which the world on the whole opposed. And we participated quite cleverly, admittedly over the wishes of a majority of the population, in only sending a few troops.

    Australia has also has arguably had some foreign policy success in engaging with Asia, which has been done quietly by successive governments. There has also been some success in the area, putting peace keeping troops into the islands and so on.
  • cam . # .
    Threats: The only nation that can project their military power in such a way to threaten us at the moment is the US. And as you said, we have a strong relationship with them that goes back to when the American merchant ships used to hide Irish convicts and take them back to the US.

    Australia and America both have McDonalds, so war, or even open conflict is unlikely.

    The other issue is, our main trading partners are Asia. Unfortunately our economy remains dominated by commodities. Only the wine industry has created a powerful value-added export market around our primary production. Most of the stuff we ship off to China and Japan is raw materials.

    We are not alone there, Asia is America\'s factories, as well as Australia\'s. But consequently it makes sense for us to align more strongly with where our wealth is coming from. The US just isnt that important there, IIRC in 1990, 63% of our exports went to Asia. I think the US only accounted for about 11%.

    The Au-US FTA was a bit of a poisoned pill in copyright/DMCA, and our going to Iraq did not stop the sugar lobby and other agricultural lobbies from have quotas in the \"free\" trade agreement. The US does play power politics, and we are not big enough or nasty enough to have that much notice taken of us. Basically we get shafted if the US decides it wants to shaft us.

    All our governments have fallen under the sway of the \"great and powerful friends\" doctrine. Which is based on power politics. Basically Australia is nothing unless it has a big friend that it can try and work concessions out of. But none of the Australian governments, despite their belief in power politics, has done anything to make us a power.

    I find that odd. Especially as since we were poised to jump that level at the end of World War II with the residual size of our forces, and the amount of immigration we were accepting.

    We have the fifteenth largest economy on the planet, though it is small compared to the US, Japanese and Chinese economies. But our military is known as being small and not independant. Indonesia laughed at us when Howard and Downer tried to play populist power politics by saying we should attack any country that harbours terrorists.

    We could destroy Indonesia\'s military capability and communications infrastructure in short order. But maintain any sort of presence? We just dont have that kind of tail in our military. We rely on the US for that kind of projection.

    Worse, since Howard is so keen on power politics, he is actually lessening Australian projection, despite the defence white papers claiming that projection over Australia\'s main vulnerabilities (ie the air-sea gap) is the ADF\'s and the government\'s prime concern.

    Air Warfare Destroyers arent going to help that. Abrams tanks arent going to help that. The LHDs arent going to help that. Retiring the F111 early means we lose a deterrent that projects across that gap. Replacing them with 400km cruise missiles is a loss of projection.

    So Howard, despite trading in power politics, is trading away our hard power, for a closer alliance with the US when it appears we should be going the other direction. Building up our hard power (there is an arms race in Asia atm anyway) and distancing outrselves from the US so we can act more independantly regionally.

    There are a lot of contradictions. I always thought Howard\'s strong support for the US was reflexive, and not necessarily thought out from a philosophical point of view. I also believed that the Howard government does not understand defence. They understand the domestic political ramifications of it, which as you mentioned, was to only put enough troops over in Iraq so it didnt become a domestic issue that threatened his popularity, but in terms of establishing a military that is a coherent deterrent capable of projecting hard power - they have no idea.

    cam
  • cam . # .
    Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: is an excellent book which covers the early history of the department of foreign affairs.

    I got it in the National Library\'s bookshop a few years ago when I was searching for the original draft constitution that Inglis-Clark wrote. Apparently it had a Bill of Rights in it that Samuel Griffiths struck out. Inglis-Clark was a romanticist for the American constitution too, so it would be interesting to see what he wrote.

    The national library didnt have it, and didnt know what I was talking about.

    cam
  • siento . # .
    Lack of power: The point that our trade with Asia is really big is a really strong. We need to strengthen our value adding and add more depth to our exports. This is where the current Liberal government has been poor. In the long run it looks like Australia will become a real Asian country. Hopefully we can get the best of both worlds.

    The FTA with the US may be a good thing. The DMCA thing may not be that great. Enforcing the DMCA in Australia might be very difficult. We\'ll have to wait a while to see what happens and even then it will be hard to work it out. Even 10 years after NAFTA there is still a lot of debate about it\'s effects.

    What point is there these days in having a military capable of occupation against real hostility? The US - with an approximately half trillion dollar defense budget is being humbled by tens of thousands of guys with explosives, AK-47s and RPGs.

    We have sufficient projection, as you say, to cause anyone within a reasonable range pain. That\'s enough. It also makes them feel safe. If we have a carier fleet and marines the Indonesians may feel threatened, and with reason.

    Australia can carry out heavy-policing duties as shown by the East Timor stabilisation.

    We are certainly pandering to the US. But we are also trying to maintain good relations with everyone else as much as possible.

    That\'s fine most of the time. It only really comes to a head when there are things like the current business with China\'s diplomats defecting and in the Middle East where US policy is significantly different to the rest of the world.