I believe that a separate executive is a more democratic form of government than a parliamentary system . In certain situations a gubernatorial system is superior to a parliamentary one. NSW is one such example that would benefit from a separate executive. So here is a gubernatorial NSW constitution which contains nothing innovative or new; it is a modern permutation of the current NSW Constitution Act .

A couple of other things; I basically nicked the Tasmanian electoral system as I made the Legislative a unicameral body. Since NSW is a state and not a federal system I did not see the need for an upper house since the executive is split out into the position of Governor, however I tempered unicameralism with a pluralist legislative body that has multi-member districts - like Tasmania.

I also kept the constitutional language terse. Australia has a strong history of statutory innovation to maintain good governance. The United States on the other hand has constitutional innovations galore in its states' however their statutory innovations are very poor and non-existent. The best outcome would be if Australia gets a little dose of American constitutional innovation while America gets a dose of Australian statutory innovation. I have tried that here by leaving many aspects of the constitution to be supported by statutory acts.

Executive

Executive power shall be vested in the Governor who shall hold office for the term of four years and a maximum of two terms. The Governor shall be elected by electors.

The Governor is disqualified from serving in the Executive if: the Governor is a current member of the executive or judicature; the Governor directly, or indirectly, himself, or by any person whatsoever in trust for him or for his use or benefit or on his account, undertakes, executes, holds, or enjoys in the whole or in part any contract or agreement for or on account of the Public Service of New South Wales; the Governor is bankrupt; convicted of an infamous crime carrying a term of greater than ten years.

Judges, ministers and officials of the executive shall be appointed by the Governor upon the advice and consent of the Legislature. No judge, minister or official may concurrently be a member of the executive and another branch of government. Ministers and official of the executive shall hold office during the Governor's pleasure.

Legislative

The legislature, as a unicameral body, shall, subject to the provisions in this constitution, have power to make laws for peace, welfare and good government of New South Wales.

Every bill shall be presented to the Governor after passage through the Legislature with a majority. Bills shall become an act of legislature when assented to by the Governor.

There shall be a session of the Legislature at the minimum of once in every calendar year such that a period of twelve months is the maximum between sessions.

A member of the Legislature is disqualified from serving in the Legislature if: the person is a current member of the executive or judicature; the person directly, or indirectly, himself, or by any person whatsoever in trust for him or for his use or benefit or on his account, undertakes, executes, holds, or enjoys in the whole or in part any contract or agreement for or on account of the Public Service of New South Wales; the person fails to attend a session of the Legislature; the person is bankrupt; convicted of an infamous crime carrying a term of greater than ten years.

The Legislature shall be composed of members from electorates where each electorate contains three members.

Members of the legislature shall hold their office for the term of two years and may serve a maximum of twelve terms.

Members may resign as a member of the Legislative by hand-written memorandum to the Speaker. Upon receipt of resignation by the Speaker, the seat of the member shall be vacant.

Upon a vacancy in the Legislature the next candidate in the vacant electorate, who is not currently a member, who has the highest number of votes from the electorate shall become a member of the Legislature.

The Speaker shall be the presiding officer of the Legislature and shall be elected by the Legislature, through a secret ballot, upon the first assembly after an election. The Speaker shall be recognized as the Legislature's independent and impartial representative. The Speaker shall preside at all meetings of the Legislature.

Judicature

The highest court is the Supreme Court which has the sole judicial authority to interpret this constitution. The relative status of any other court of New South Wales is to be determined by legislation.

The Chief Justice shall be the office of the Master of the Supreme Court.

The Chief Justice shall issue writs for election on the appropriate dates for the Executive and Legislature.

Local Government

The local governments in New South Wales shall make their own charters and constitutions in order to manage their affairs.

Amendment

The constitution amendment is passed if: a majority of electors voting approves, a super-majority in the legislature, the signature of the Governor.

Exclusions

Since Australia has no bill of rights, this is where Avocadia's Bill of Rights v0.2 would go though termed in the negative rather than declarative.

Critique and amend away!

Update

This constitution has been amended with the suggestions below and some other improvements in a new article.

cam
Cam Riley: South Sea Republic. Freedom, liberty, equity and an Australian Republic.

Comments

  • Seats, disqualification.: Three members per seats doesn\'t sound like it\'s going to achieve anything, except having thre times the number of members needed (or, a third as much representation as you could get). I would also put such things into regular legislation...

    The Governor/A member of the Legislature is disqualified from serving in the Executive/Legislature if: ... convicted of an infamous crime carrying a term of greater than ten years.

    or tampering with the electoral system, regardless of the term, of course.
  • cam . # .
    I put the three members per seat in: as it is unicameral so it requires some sort of proportional system to get the pluralism that an upper house allows. Since an electoral act could sabotage that by making it single member electorates with preferential voting (effectively a two-party duopoly) I thought that character of the system needed to be elevated to the constitutional.

    Good point on tampering with the electoral system.

    cam
  • Alan . # .
    Removal?: I tend to agree with you at state level, although it\'s important for a national government to have a dual executive to prevent presidents from spending too much time masquerading as a man on horseback or in a flightsuit.

    I\'m interested in your proposal. How would you provide for removals?
  • cam . # .
    Dont know on removal: As I didn\'t want to put in something too blunt. Not for the state level anyway. What you do for removal inside that style of constitution?

    cam
  • Alan . # .
    Removal?: Well, an irremovable executive is a very bad idea. The constitution needs to allow for impeachment or recall. I\'d suugest allowing the the Legislature to impeach the governor before a citizens jury with the chief justice as moderator. Imeachment should not be restricted to high crimes and misdeneanours, which makes it almost useless in the US.

    A Novostrocambrianisation of South Africa\'s rule would read:
    89 Removal of Governor
    (1) The Legislature, by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members, may remove the Governor from office only on the grounds of-
    (a) a serious violation of the Constitution or the law;
    (b) serious misconduct; or
    (c) inability to perform the functions of office.

    You also need to provide for vacancies in the governorship. I\'d argue really strongly that a governor should always be elected and US-style succession belongs back in the Middle Ages. Maybe the chief justice should take over for a brief time until an election can be held.
  • cam . # .
    I decided against an elected: Lieutenant Governor or Attorney General. I didnt want a Lieutenant Governor in the system as they would pollute up the legislative. I am comfortable with the Speaker becoming the Governor until the next election. The legislative has a frequency of 2 years between elections, so a deposed Speaker-become-Governor at max would be 24 months in the job. I would prefer the Speaker to a Chief Justice as the Speaker has to have the confidence of their electorate and the house.

    The snippet taken from the South African constitution is good and seems a wise inclusion.

    cam