Another site that many of us frequent has held MFCs (music fun challenge) and WFCs (writing fun challenge). The equivalent in the political sphere is constitution writing. It is also an area that Australia has not excelled at. So in the interests of increasing Australian constitution writing skills, South Sea Republic is holding an informal and friendly competition to write a constitution, or part of a constitution.

The "Bearded Men" pretty much botched the Australian constitution, and the states haven't improved much either. Queensland recently rewrote their constitution into one document and it was pretty ordinary too. States like Tasmania, South Australia and Western Australia still do not have one, the sovereignty for their government system is spread across numerous Acts, including British ones.

So we need more constitution writing skills in Australia.

South Sea Republic is heavily constitutionally focused, so it makes sense that a fun challenge involve constitution drafting and writing skills. So this is your challenge;

Write a constitution or part of constitution for an ideal government.

The parts can include;

• Executive
• Legislative
• Judicial
• Preamble
• Governor-General
• States
• Rights
• anything else

It doesn't have to be complete, it can be as small or as large as you like. It does not have to be perfect, innovate ideas to solve constitutional and procedural issues will be highly valued.

You can also enter as many entries as you like and is not limited to Australian entries either. Rewrite the American constitution, Swiss constitution, or Iraqi constitution ... anything is fair game.

End of May is the cut-off date.

A common cry is that the judicial, rather than interpreting the constitution, is activist and making judgements that are more legislative than juridical. The judicial is treated as a specialist position and given tenure to hide it away from political or populist influence. Unfortunately the judicial often takes matters into its own interpretive hands and expands the power of those that appoint them.

There is very little check and balance on the Australian Judicial branch. Since 1986 the High Court of Australia has been the highest court in the country, displacing the Privy Council in the United Kingdom as the highest court of appeal. Since 1968 the High Court of Australia had been the highest court of appeal on constitutional and federal issues.

In Australia the Prime Minister or Premier appoint Justices without oversight beyond the Executive Cabinet. This is in contrast to the stronger checks and balances in the US system where the Executive recommends a judge/justice to the Legislative who must then approve it.

This is a simple check on Executive stupidity and political appointments . In the Australian form of Westminster separation of powers demands that at the least the upper-houses (Senate and Councils) have no members of the Executive Cabinet in them, making them purely Legislative.

The Executive Cabinet would be required to recommend judicial appointments to the Senate/Councils where they would need to be approved by majority after public debate on the appointment.

Lionel Murphy changed Judicial doctrine in the Australian High Court quite drastically, believing that it was up to the High Court to make the Australian Constitution a living breathing document. This is in part because the Australian Constitution is poorly written and almost impossible to change under the referendum requirements.

It is also part of another doctrine that has infected Australian federalism since its inception of entropic and dynamic collapse of all power to Canberra. The Judicial has aided, abetted and accelerated this process.

As adam commented , this has been achieved by seeking obtuse nuance in what is clear constitutional language;

What's insidious about the constitution being changed through common law, eg in the US, is that the relatively clear language of the original document is interpreted to become a term of art. Eventually the succession of rulings can become so distant from the original text that to compare them side by side is an exercise in absurdity or even deconstruction.

The recent US ruling on eminent domain seems the perfect example of this to me. This is also what's behind the US doctrine of originating intent. I'm not sure whether the court is able to heal these rifts itself.

So how do you save the judicial from its own over-reach?

The Constitution represents the limits on Executive, Legislative and Judicial authority, which the Judicial is the final interpreter of; but it contains few limitations on the Judicial ability to act. Australian justices are required to retire at seventy-five, while in the US they just die on the job.

In a federal system, federalist over-reach is supposed to be stopped by the unitary components - the states. The Senate is composed of state membership, but political parties and party discipline have corrupted that check and balance on the federalist system.

Yet constitutional challenges to legislation have often involved a majority, or near majority, of states. For instance the challenge to Workchoices comes from NSW, Western Australia and Tasmania.

Is it possible that a check and balance on poor Judicial performance by a Justice, such as one that is opposed to a strict reading of the constitution, and who brings anti-federalist interpretations can have their position on the High Court challenged by the states.

This could act as a Judicial form of impeachment that would require a majority of states and state parliaments to pass legislation requiring a Justice's removal.

There would be the fear that this would politicise the Judicial arm of federal government but since most of the appointments to the High Court are political rather than based on merit or specialist history, then this is not necessarily something that is not occurring already.

This check and balance would be that tenure can be revoked by the states.

Remember folks, end of May is the deadline for the Constitution Fun Challenge slash NaCoWriMo.

It does not have to be a complete constitution, it can be a part of one or an incomplete stab at one. We will do CFCs periodically so you can build upon this entry. There will be about a week of collecting constitutions, and then formal entries will close and a poll will be added to the front page so we can vote on the best entry.

Also note that if you have an account and are logged in here, click on the New Article Entry link to the right to publish your constitution on SSR. If you have supporting pdfs/graphs etc, then upload them in the Your Files link, and link to them directly with a href tag.

Some fundamental questions to ponder which a constitution may have to answer;

• What legitimates power?
• What is the state?
• What are the limitations of the state?
• How is sovereignty defined?

In a few hours it will be June 1st, which is the closing date for the Constitution Fun Challenge (NaCoWriMo). There will be a week for the different constitutions to be published on SSR, then I will post a wrap up with a poll.

Don't worry if your constitution is not finished (mine isn't) post it anyway, as we will do another CFC later in the year and you can continue on/revise your constitution.

To post a Constitution on SSR, you need to have an account here, if you don't have one, create one .

If you have supporting PDF files to upload, then click on the Your Files link, and upload them to SSR.

Then post your article by clicking on the New Article Entry link. Choose a section (articles or rafferty's), choose the topic as CFC/NaCoWriMo, fill in the intro (SSR convention is no more than two paragraphs in the intro) and then fill out the body with any explanations and the constitution.

It would be cool if you could post the constitution into the body of the article, but if it isn't working out, then linking to a PDF is ok too. To link to a PDF from the your files section, you will need to link by an A HREF tag.

If you have problems formatting the text to your liking, publish the article anyway, and then bring it to the attention of myself, adam, avocadia or any of the other editors to clean up the formatting.

I will post mine tomorrow. Like I said, don't worry if it is incomplete, or just one section, or a bill of rights, or editing part of an existing constitution, or whatever; nothing too small or too big is out of bounds. Publish or be damned :)

We have until June 7th to publish them. Then I will post the wrap up article which links to them all.

cam

My entry into the Constitution Fun Challenge. It has three separate branches and attempts to divide any power structure under a principle of elected, specialist and sortitionist.

This started out as a Westminster style system with some modifications that we have discussed in the past like a Rights Referee Governor-General. Then I added a People's Chamber in the house which was a quarter of the house; but I turned it into a sortitionist's body with only a couple of specialists left, with the Treasurer leading the house.

The Senate becomes a supra-national body, able to accept representation outside of Australia itself as needed. The Senate is also composed of elected specialists (ie politicians) and act as the main check on a separate executive.

The Executive contains the Governor-General and Cabinet. The Governor-Magistrate is like a vice-president, but is part of the Judicature. Kind of a mix between VP and Chief Magistrate. The GM is tasked with actively intervening in the executive's actions and setting forth commissions and inquiries. Probably needs some more refinement, but I like the active watchdog role on the executive. The Judicature also has a Citizens Council which is the sortitionist body for the Judicature.

The states get more of a role too, as a federalist system, they get the most involvement in the Judicature which watches the Executive (who corrodes state power the fastest).

Thanks to Avocadia for the use of his Bill of Rights which makes up section 2.8. This entry is incomplete and I will return to it next CFC.

1.Constitution

1. A constitution for the Republic of the Southern Seas.
2. This document defines the Commonwealth Government.
3. The constitution defines the responsibilities of the three equal, but separate, branches of Australian republican government; Executive, Legislative and Judicature.

2.Commons

1. The republic recognizes that the commons cannot be reduced or suspended; by referendum, emergency, or a declaration of war by parliament.
2. The republic recognizes that a citizen is any individual under the jurisdiction of the government of this constitution.
3. The republic recognizes that an individual's political rights are inviolable.
4. The republic recognizes that an elector is a citizen born in Australia, or an individual within the jurisdiction of Australia who is above the age of majority.
5. The republic recognizes that no election is legitimate without a secret ballot; where the ballot sheets are of uniform shape and colour; and where the elector's ballot is cast anonymously.
6. The political limits espoused in this constitution are not complete, and the limits on legislative, executive and juridical authority are far greater, however history has shown these political rights are the ones most commonly transgressed by corrupt and tyrannous government.
7. The Governor Magistrate has the authority to instigate criminal proceedings against the Governor-General, members of parliament or members of the judicature, should the commons be abrogated by an act of the Executive, bill of the Legislative, or legal decision of the Judicature.
8. The Executive shall execute no law; the Legislative shall make no law; and the Judicature shall endorse no law as constitutional; that:
   
   Freedom
   1. deprives an individual of life
   2. limits or deprives an individuals freedom to express their beliefs, opinions or lifestyle.
   3. limits or deprives an individual's freedom of movement
   4. limits or deprives an individual's freedom of association
   5. limits or deprives an individuals freedom to peacefully assemble with other individuals.
   6. limits or deprives an individuals right to peaceful protest.
      
      Liberty
   7. detains an individual indefinitely without charge.
   8. limits or removes an individuals right to have counsel with them upon arrest or questioning.
   9. limits or removes an individuals right to a writ of habeous corpus upon detention.
   10. back-dates punitive measures for an offence.
   11. permits an individual to be detained for longer than six months without trial or resolution
   12. enabling an individual to be tried for an offence more than once.
   13. limits or removes an individual's right to refuse law enforcement access to their property, or permission to search their person and property, unless there is a warrant issued to search specific property for evidence of a specific crime.
   14. limits or removes an individuals choice to divulge no information other than their identity, verbally, when under suspicion from law enforcement for a specific crime.
   15. limits, reduces or removes an individual's right to own property
   16. deprives the individual of property, or devalues an individual's property without fair exchange or consent.
       
       Equity
   17. discriminates against an individual on the basis of race, age, gender, sexual preference, wealth, health, religion, associations or prior criminal record.
   18. limits or removes equal treatment under the law for an individual on the basis of race, age, gender, sexual preference, wealth, health, religion, associations or prior criminal record.
   19. limits or removes access to government services for an individual on the basis of race, age, gender, sexual preference, wealth, health, religion, associations or prior criminal record.
       
       Democracy
   20. disenfranchises an elector.
   21. denies an elector representation
   22. denies an elector the ability to run for election
   23. reduces or removes an individual the ability to petition their representatives for a redress of grievances.
   24. abolishes the secret ballot
   25. increases the period between elections beyond eight years.
   26. criminalises, or outlaws a political party.
   27. removes access to the Public Service for parties with elected parliamentary members.

3.Executive

1. The Executive is the sole body in the republic authorised to execute laws.
2. The Executive shall, as demanded in this constitution, faithfully implement and execute the laws passed by the legislative.
3. The Executive shall, as demanded in this constitution, submit to juridical oversight of the execution of laws.

3.4.Governor General

1. The Governor General shall be elected by popular election.
2. The Governor-General cannot serve more than two terms of office or eight years, depending on which comes first.
3. The Governor-General shall veto any law, bill or act which contradicts the limits of Legislative authority in the commons.
4. The Governor-General shall veto any law that does not meet the holder's approval and return the law to the Legislative along with written objections.
5. The Governor-General is the head of the Executive Council.
6. The Governor-General shall nominate the Ministers that comprise the Executive Council.
7. The Governor-General shall nominate a Minister, to replace any Ministers removed by successful no-confidence motions in parliament, who has resigned, or replaced by the Governor-General's choice.
8. The Governor-General shall nominate the Ministerial Departments required to execute the laws passed by the legislative.
9. The Governor-General shall present, to a dual sitting of parliament with the Executive Council present, a report on the Executive Ministries.

3.5.Executive Council

1. The Executive Council shall consist of Ministers who head a Ministerial Department as constructed by Legislative bill.
2. ...

4.Legislative

1. The Legislative is the sole body in the republic authorised to make laws, acts and bills.
2. The Legislative shall make no law that persists beyond twenty-five years.
3. The Legislative shall be composed of two bodies; the Senate and House.
4. The Legislature shall not present a bill to the Governor-General to be signed into law unless both Senate and House have passed the exact same bill.

4.5.Senate

1. The Senate shall be composed of multi-member districts consisting of constituent states, territories and/or extra-national territories.
2. The Senate electoral districts shall be apportioned members based on population of the constituent districts.
3. A Senator cannot serve more than twenty-five years in Parliament.
4. The Senate shall conduct non-budgetary commissions and inquiries into the conduct of the Governor-General, Executive Council and Public Servants in the Executive Ministries.
5. The Senate shall conduct commissions and inquiries into the conduct of the Judicature.
6. The Senate shall, upon majority vote, recommend further investigations into the Executive to the Governor-Magistrate for conduct by the Citizens Council.
7. The Senate shall approve or reject any Judicial nominations.
8. The Senate shall approve or reject any Executive Council nominations.
9. The Senate shall not initiate any money bills.
10. The Senate shall not initiate any no-confidence votes on the non-elected members of the Executive Council.
11. The Senate shall be able to pass by two-thirds majority, no-confidence motions on non-elected members of the Executive Council.

4.6.House

1. The House shall be composed of two internal bodies, of which one will be elected, and the other chosen from the general population by sortition.
2. A House member cannot serve more than twenty five years in Parliament.
3. The elected members shall be known collectively as the House Elected Body and individually as House Electors.
4. The sortitionist members shall be known collectively as the House Citizens Body and individually as House Citizens.
5. The House elected body shall consist of a maximum of one House Elector for each state, and territory.
6. The Treasurer shall be chosen by majority in the House Elected Body as the head of the House.
7. The Treasurer shall chair, or delegate the position of chair, all inquiries and commissions into the budgetary needs and financial conduct of the Executive, Legislative and Judicature.
8. The Treasurer shall present each year, to a dual sitting of parliament with the Executive Council present, a report on the budget.
9. The House Citizens Body shall not consist of less than one sortitionist for each twenty thousand of population.
10. The House Citizens Body shall vote on all bills.
11. The House Citizens Body shall be chosen by lot each year.
12. A citizen who has been chosen for consecutive House Citizen Bodies shall be disqualified and another sortitionist, who is not a current, nor immediately prior member of the House Citizens Body, shall take their place.
13. A House Citizen shall be able to vote in absence.
14. A House Elector shall not vote in absence.
15. The House shall be able to pass by two-thirds majority, no-confidence motions on non-elected members of the Executive Council.
16. A House Citizen may introduce legislation, in person or anonymously.

4.7.Sergeant at Arms

1. ...

5.Judicature

5.1.Governor Magistrate

1. The Governor-Magistrate shall be appointed by the States.
2. The Governor-Magistrate cannot serve in office more than two terms of or eight years depending on which comes first.
3. The Governor-Magistrate can divert bills or acts, prior to their signing into law by the Governor-General, deemed to be of dubious constitutionality to the High Court to determine their constitutionality.
4. The Governor-Magistrate can recommend commissions and inquiries into the conduct of the Legislature for the Citizen's Council to conduct.
5. The Governor-Magistrate shall forward all Senatorial recommendations for commissions and inquiries into the Executive for the Citizen's Council to conduct.
6. The Governor-Magistrate shall present all findings of commissions and inquiries into the conduct of the Executive and Legislature to joint sittings of Parliament with the Executive Council present.

5.2.High Court

1. The High Court shall be the sole authority to interpret the constitution.
2. The High Court shall contain a Chief Justice and as many other Justices, but no less than two, as parliament determines necessary.
3. A Justice shall not serve on the High Court, for more than twenty-five years.
4. A Justice shall not serve on, or be appointed to, the High Court if they are above seventy years of age.

5.3.Citizens Council

1. The Council shall be composed of sortitionists chosen by lot from the states and territories.
2. A citizen who has been chosen for consecutive Citizen's Councils shall be disqualified and another sortitionist, who is not a current, nor immediately prior member of the Citizens Council, shall take their place.
3. The Council shall ensure fair access by citizenry to the data and documents produced by government.
4. The Council shall grant or reject; as well as oversee, freedom of information access by the citizenry.
5. The Council shall grant or reject, as well as oversee, national security access by the citizenry.
6. The Council shall conduct commissions and inquiries, as recommended by the Governor Magistrate, into the conduct of the Legislative.
7. The Council shall conduct all commissions and inquiries into ethics for the Legislative.
8. The Council shall conduct all commissions and inquires into corruption for the Legislative.

6.States

1. The States shall nominate a qualified Judge, by majority, to fill any vacancy in the High Court.
2. The States shall bring forward proceedings of impeachment against a member of the High Court who has approved into constitutional law legislation that abrogates the Commons.
3. Upon impeachment the decision shall only be over-turned by a super-majority of Senate and House.
4. ...

7.Other

1. Auditor General
2. Citizen Auditors
3. Referendum
4. Citizen Referenda

A sketch of a new Queensland constitution. The main change is the revival of the Legislative Council (Upper House) as a jury selected by lot from the population at large. The constitution is divided into two elements, a static constitution changeable only by popular referendum, and a dynamic constitution changeable by a supermajority of both houses of parliament.

The Government of Queensland exists at the behest, and to defend the liberty and well-being of, the people of Queensland.

Only the Parliament may pass laws; an identical text must be approved by the Legislative Assembly, Legislative Council, and the Governor.

The government shall pass no law infringing the rights of the electors, as laid out in this constitution.

The government shall conceal no document from the public for more than 30 years.

1. Definitions

1.1 An elector is any Australian resident, who is also a resident of Queensland, and is 18 or more years old. Voting in elections is compulsory for all electors.

1.2 A person is considered partisan if
    a. They are a member of the Legislative Assembly
    b. They are appointed to a partisan position in the Legislative Council
    c. They are a member of a state or federal registered political party
    d. They have filled any of the above criteria in the last 10 years

2. Mechanics
    2.1 A 50% + 1 majority in any vote is termed a simple majority
    2.2 A two-thirds majority of both the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council is termed a joint supermajority
    2.3 All general elections and referenda must be fair secret ballots with no distinguishing mark inherent in the ballot paper or device
    2.4 All uses of sortition must be fair lotteries where each candidate of n candidates has a 1/n chance of being drawn

3. Legislative Assembly
    3.1 Lower house of parliament
    3.2 Parliamentarians elected from either
        a. single member geographical districts of similar size.
        b. multi-member geographical districts of similar size. Each electorate must
        return at least 20 members, where seats are allocated in proportion to the number
        of votes cast
        c. For either type of electorate,
            c.1 the largest and smallest electorates by population may not differ in size
            by more than 2000 electors.
            c.2 Mainland electorates must be contiguous
            c.3 Electorates may follow well established geographic features, but must
            favour area over circumference, ie, tend towards circles
    3.3 The Premier commands the confidence of the Legislative Assembly
    3.4 Passes bills with a simple majority
    3.5 May contain at most 400 members
    3.6 Members may serve in parliament for at most 25 years total
    3.7 The Assembly must be dissolved and a general election held at most every 5 years
    3.8 Members are dismissed if they are convicted of a criminal offence
    3.9 Members must be electors

4. Legislative Council
    4.1 Small house of review
    4.2 At least 20 members must be appointed by sortition from a pool of citizen nominees
    4.3 At most 3 partisan and 3 non-partisan members may be appointed by the government of the day
    4.4 Passes bills with a simple majority
    4.5 The Legislative Council must be smaller than the Legislative Assembly
    4.6 May not vote on money bills
    4.7 May summon witnesses as before a court of law, and may delegate this power to committees
    4.8 May instruct the Commission of Audit to investigate
    4.9 Members serve for one year, but may choose to extend that service to 3 years
    4.10 Any member may serve in the Legislative Council at most 10 years
    4.11 Members are dismissed if they are
        a. Convicted of a criminal offence
        b. Dismissed by a two-thirds supermajority of the Legislative Council, which
        is then confirmed by a simple majority of the Legislative Assembly
    4.12 Members must be electors

5. Governor (or Referee)
    5.1 Signs bills into law and is Head of State, but is limited to the powers listed immediately below
    5.2 May ask the Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of a bill before signing it into law. The Supreme Court must begin consideration of such bills within a year of them being so referred.
    5.3 Summons and dismisses parliament
    5.4 Serves a single term of at most 7 years
    5.5 Is appointed as follows
        a. A joint supermajority approves a list of non-partisan candidates. There must be
        a minimum of three candidates.
        b. The Governor-elect is chosen from this list by sortition.
        c. The Governor-elect becomes Governor at the expiration of the predecessor's term,
        or immediately, if the predecessor has been dismissed or incapacitated
    5.6 May be dismissed by the same mechanism
    5.7 Appoints and dismisses Cabinet ministers following the advice of the Premier or parliament
    5.8 Appoints and dismisses a Premier following the advice of the Legislative Assembly

6. Premier
    6.1 Is a member of the Legislative Assembly
    6.2 Commands the confidence of the Legislative Assembly
    6.3 Is Head of Government
    6.4 Nominates cabinet
    6.5 May not serve beyond 10 years, including previous terms as Premier
        a. A Premier retiring because of this term limit must also retire from the
        Legislative Assembly
        b. A retired Premier may not be appointed to a partisan position on the
        Legislative Council
    6.6 Must be a member of a registered political party

7. Cabinet
    7.1 Appointed from partisan members of either house of parliament
    7.2 Members of cabinet are ministers, and head departments
    7.3 Ministers are responsible to parliament for the actions of their department
    7.4 May be dismissed by joint supermajority

8. Supreme Court
    8.1 Hears serious criminal cases
    8.2 Interprets the state constitution
    8.3 Is non-partisan
    8.4 Is nominated by the Legislative Assembly and confirmed by the Legislative Council; a simple majority of each
    8.5 Members may stay until their death or resignation

9. Commission of Audit
    9.1 May summon witnesses as before a court of law, and may delegate this power to committees
    9.2 Is nominated by the Legislative Assembly and confirmed by the Legislative Council
    9.3 May be prompted by parliament to start an investigation
    9.4 May initiate investigations
    9.5 Must report to parliament and to the people

10. Civil Service
    10.1 The government shall maintain a civil service for the staffing of ministerial departments
    10.2 The Civil service exists to provide impartial and expert advice to ministers and parliament

11. Bill of Rights
    11.1 [left as an exercise for the alert reader]

12. Amending This Document

    12.1 The static constitution may be amended by
        a. A Referendum of all electors:
            a.1 Either:
                a.1.1 A resolution to hold a referendum must be passed by both houses, or
                a.1.2 2% of the electors must sign a petition calling for a referendum
            a.2 For the purpose of the referendum, the state shall be divided into two electorates.
                a.2.1 Mainland electorates must be separated by a single line
                a.2.2 The largest and smallest electorates by population may not differ
                in size by more than 2000 electors.
                a.2.3 The state's largest city must be entirely contained within one of
                the electorates.
                a.2.4 A majority in each electorate must affirm the referendum for the
                constitution to change.

    12.2 The sections above are termed the Static Constitution.

    12.3 The sections below are termed the Dynamic Constitution.

    12.4 The dynamic constitution may be amended by
        a. The mechanism described for changing the static constitution, or
        b. A joint supermajority

[In practise I imagine this being filled out in more detail of the precise algorithms etc used]

13. Terms of parliament
    13.1 Elections for every member of the Legislative Assembly shall be held at most every
    three years.
    13.2 Elections shall be called by the Governor on the advice of the Premier, or if no member
    commands the confidence of the Legislative Assembly

14. Composition
    14.1 The Legislative Assembly shall have one multi-member seat, returning 20 members.

15. Methods of election
    15.1 Elections for single member seats shall be conducted by compulsory preferential voting
    15.2 Elections for multi-member seats shall be conducted by compulsory preferential
    proportional voting

16. Methods of appointment to the Legislative Council
    16.1 Rounds of appointment by sortition to the Legislative Council shall occur at most
    every six months.
    16.2 Members selected to sit in the Legislative Council must pass a brief examination on its
    function, [contained in an appendix. This would be a short 10 question quiz, possibly
    even multi-choice]

17. Reimbursement
    17.1 The Governor, and the members of the Legislative Assembly, shall be paid a salary
    by the state
    17.2 Members of the Legislative Council shall be paid at least the minimum state salary
    drawn by members of the Legislative Assembly

18. Resource Rights
    18.1 [These consist of water, land and other resource rights]

We would be a republic now if the elite and the people could agree on a way to appoint the president. The polls consistently show that the Australian people wish to elect the president. Repeated statements by the government and opposition show the elite rejects the idea of popular election.

Looking for a way to resolves this, I thought about British Columbia, Ontario and the Netherlands. All of them are using Citizens Assemblies, randomly elected, to deal with electoral reform.

My idea is to elect a ceremonial president by the same process. Chapter 4 is part of a complete constitution which is still a work in progress. So is the explanatory memo, but that's another story.

Contrary to elite mythology, writing down the rules for a parliamentary system is actually easy, so easy it is actually the norm to which Australia, Britain, Canada and New Zealand are the exceptions. Even within the UK, the Scotland Act and the Government of Wales Act have written rules for electing and dismissing the First Minister in the two devolved governments.

I've pulled ideas from many places and tried to write them in a common style. The presidential council is an example. Most republican proposals say the senior state governor. That could be a real problem in any state either abolishes its governor or makes it an elective position. The council model followed by Ireland and Iceland is a better idea.

The sections aren't numbered because this is still a work in progress. There is one remaining title to Chapter 4 which will deal with issues like treaty-making, defence, and public appointments. So here is Chapter 4 of an imaginary constitution.

Chapter 4 The Executive
Title 1 The President of the Republic

Executive Power
The executive power of the Republic is vested in the President of the Republic and extends to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, and of the laws of the Republic and is exercisable only with, and in accordance with, the advice of Ministers responsible to the National Assembly.

The President
The President of the Republic-

a is the Head of State;

b must uphold, defend and respect the Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic;

c promotes the unity of the nation and the advancement of the Republic; and

d takes precedence over all other persons in the Republic.

Powers and functions of the President
(1) The President has the powers entrusted by the Constitution and the laws, including those necessary to perform the functions of Head of State.

(2) The President is responsible for -

a assenting to and signing Bills;

b summoning the National Assembly, the Senate or the Parliament to an extraordinary meeting to conduct special business;

c dissolving the National Assembly in terms of Chapter 3, Title 1;

d dissolving both the National Assembly and the Senate Deadlocked Bills;

e making any appointments that the Constitution or the laws require the President to make;

f appointing commissions of inquiry;

g proclaiming a referendum as required by law;

h receiving and recognising foreign diplomatic and consular deputies;
i appointing ambassadors, plenipotentiaries, and diplomatic and consular deputies;

j pardoning or reprieving offenders and remitting any fines, penalties or forfeitures; and

k conferring honours.

(3) The President must act on the advice of the Executive Council, the Prime Minister or the appropriate Minister who are collectively and individually responsible to the National Assembly for the advice they tender to the President.
(4) The Parliament may make laws with respect to the exercise of the executive power.
(5) The President is entitled to request from the Executive Council, the Prime Minister or another Minister as appropriate, information on any particular matter relating to the government that is relevant to the performance or exercise of the President's functions or powers.

Election of President
(1) Whenever necessary to fill a vacancy, a Citizens Assembly must elect an Australian to be the President. A Citizens Assembly for the election of the President must be convened not less than 2 months before the end of the presidential term.

(2) The method of election must be the single transferable vote and the ballot must be secret.

(3) An election to fill a casual vacancy in the office of President must be held at a time and on a date determined by the Justice Chancellor, but not more than 30 days after the vacancy occurs.

(4) The President must, on the day of election, be capable of being elected as a deputy or senator.

(5) A candidate for President may be nominated by any political party represented in the National Assembly or the Senate or by one-tenth of the delegates to the Citizens Assembly.

Assumption of office by the President
(1) A new President must assume office within 14 days by swearing or affirming faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution in accordance with Schedule 2.

(2) The oath or affirmation must be made before the Citizens Assembly which elected the President or a person authorised by the Citizens Assembly to administer the oath or affirmation.

Term of office of President
(1) The President's term of office is 5 years from the day on which the President assumes office.

(2) No person may hold office as President for more than two terms.

Removal from office of President
(1) A Citizens Assembly, by absolute majority, may remove the President from office only on the grounds of -

a a serious violation of the Constitution or the law;

b serious misconduct; or

c incapacity to perform the functions of office.

(2) The National Assembly or the Senate, by absolute majority, may convene a Citizens Assembly for the purpose of removing the President from office.

Suspension from office of President
(1) The President may be suspended from office by the Executive Council, pending action by the Parliament, for --

a a serious violation of the Constitution or the law (including refusal or failure to act in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet, the Prime Minister or the appropriate Minister, or acting, or purporting to act contrary to, or without, any such advice);

b serious misconduct; or

c incapacity to perform the functions of office.

(2) A decision by the Executive Council to suspend the President from office does not require any assent by the President.

(3) If the President is suspended from office, the Prime Minister must immediately inform the Speaker, the Convenor and the Chief Justice of the suspension and of the reasons for it.

(4) If the President is suspended from office the Speaker and the Convenor must, as soon as practicable, call a meeting of the Parliament at which the matter of the suspension must be the first item of business after any formal business and, if necessary, the election of a Speaker or Convenor.

(5) The suspension may be lifted at any time by both the National Assembly and the Senate.

(6)  Unless within 14 sitting days of the suspension, the National Assembly or the Senate decides, by absolute majority, to convene a Citizens Assembly for the special business of removing the President from office, the suspension ceases at the end of that time.

Presidential Council
(1) When the President is suspended from office, absent from Australia or otherwise unable to fulfil the duties of President, or during a vacancy in the office of President, the powers and functions of the President must be exercised and performed by the Presidential Council.

 (2) The Presidential Council is composed of the Chief Justice, the Speaker of the National Assembly, and the Convenor of the Senate.

 (3) The next senior Justice of the High Court must act as a member of the Presidential Council in the place of the Chief Justice on any occasion on which the office of Chief Justice is vacant or on which the Chief Justice is unable to act.

 (4) The Acting Speaker of the National Assembly must act as a member of the Presidential in the place of the Speaker of the National Assembly on any occasion on which the office of Speaker of the National Assembly is vacant or on which the Speaker is unable to act.

 (5) The Acting Convenor of the Senate must act as a member of the Presidential Council in the place of the Convenor of the Senate on any occasion on which the office of Convenor of the Senate is vacant or on which the Speaker is unable to act.

 (6) A Presidential Council may act by any two of their number and may act despite a vacancy in their membership.

 (7) A Presidential Council has the responsibilities, powers and functions of the President.

 (8) Before assuming the responsibilities, powers and functions of the President, the members of the Presidential Council must swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution, in accordance with Schedule 2.

(9) A member of the Presidential Council must not exercise or perform any of the other powers and functions of their offices, except that the Chief Justice may complete any proceedings actually commenced before them unless other suitable arrangements can be made.

(10) The Parliament may provide for the designation of members of the Presidential Council in any contingency which is not provided for by this section.

Executive Decisions
(1) A decision by the President must be in writing if it is taken in terms of this Constitution or the laws or has legal consequences.

(2) Every decision by the President must be countersigned by the Cabinet member responsible for the decision.

(3) Proclamations, regulations and other instruments of subordinate legislation must be accessible to the public.

(4) The Parliament may provide the manner in which, and the extent to which, instruments mentioned in subsection (3) must be tabled in the Parliament; and approved by the Parliament.

State Matters
The Parliament may provide for the exercise and performance of state powers and functions by the President under the Constitution of any state where that Constitution so provides.

Commander-in-Chief
The command in chief of the defence forces of the Republic is vested in the President.

Terms and conditions of employment of President
(1) The President must not hold any office or position or engage in any calling other than that of, or an office or position associated with, his office as President, except with the consent of the Executive Council.

 (2) Subject to this Constitution, the terms and conditions of employment of the President are fixed by law.

 (3) Except with the consent of the President the terms and conditions of employment of the President must not be changed to his detriment during their term of office, and any law that changes them must recite the terms of the consent.

Title 2 The Executive of the Republic

Composition of the Executive Council
(1) There must be an Executive Council of the Republic to advise the President in the government of the Republic.

(2) The Executive Council is composed of the Prime Minister and the other Ministers, including any Vice-Ministers and Junior Ministers.

(3) A reference in any law to the President-in-Council or to an Order-in-Council is a reference to the President acting with, and in accordance with, the advice of the Executive Council and to an order made by the President acting with, and in accordance with, the advice of the Executive Council.

Meetings of Executive Council
(1) The President must preside over the Executive Council.

(2) However, if, for good reason, the President cannot attend, a member designated by the President must preside; or if the President has not designated a member to preside, the most senior member present must preside.

(3) Any matter decided by the Executive Council in the President's absence must be presented to the President for assent.

(4) The Executive Council must not deal with any business at a meeting unless it has been summoned to meet by the President's authority; and at least 2 members, other than any presiding member, are present for the entire meeting.

(5) The President may introduce any matter for discussion to the Executive Council.

(6) The President may convene meetings of the Executive Council but must convene a meeting when requested by the Prime Minister to do so.

(7) A meeting of the Executive Council must not be convened except by the President.

(8) The Justice Chancellor must be present at meetings of the Executive Council and when matters are presented to the President of the Republic for assent.

(9) The Ombudsman also has the right to attend these meetings and presentations.

(10) If the Justice Chancellor objects to the lawfulness of a proposed decision of the Executive Council, the Justice Chancellor must make an objection, with reasons, on the matter. If the objection is ignored, the Justice Chancellor must have the objection entered in the minutes of the Executive Council and, where necessary, must report the matter to the National Assembly (together with any information in relation to the case the Justice Chancellor considers appropriate to include); and if the decision in question has not been made, may stay the decision until the National Assembly considers the matter.

(11) Subject to this section, the procedure of the Executive Council must be determined by the Council.

Choice of the Prime Minister
(3) When a Prime Minister is to be appointed, the question of the designation must be the first matter for consideration, after any formal business and any election of a Speaker, on the next sitting day. If the National Assembly is not in session when a Prime Minister is to be appointed, the Speaker must immediately call a meeting of the National Assembly.

(1) If one of the following events occurs, the National Assembly must within the time allowed designate one of its members for appointment as Prime Minister. The designation of the next Prime Minister by a vote of no confidence satisfies the requirements of this subsection.

(2) The events are-  
 
a the first meeting of the National Assembly after a general election;
 
b the resignation of the Prime Minister;
 
c the office of Prime Minister becoming vacant otherwise than by resignation.
 
(3) The time allowed is 28 days beginning on the day on which the event in question occurs; but-
 
a if another of those events occurs within the time allowed, that time is extended for a further 28 days beginning on the day on which the new event occurs, and
 
b the time allowed ends when the President appoints a person as Prime Minister.
 
(4) The Speaker must recommend to the President the appointment of a Prime Minister who is designated by the National Assembly.

(5) If the Prime Minister resigns after a general election but before the first meeting of the National Assembly, the Speaker must recommend to the President the appointment of that deputy who is most likely to command the confidence of an absolute majority in the National Assembly, pending designation by the National Assembly.

Votes of no confidence
(1) If the National Assembly, by absolute majority, passes a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister must, within 7 days, either resign or advise the President to dissolve the National Assembly.

(2) If the National Assembly, by absolute majority, passes a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet excluding the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister must advise the President to reconstitute the Cabinet.

(3) Every motion for a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister must designate the next Prime Minister.

(4) If the National Assembly passes a vote of no confidence in the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister does not earlier either resign or advise the President to dissolve the National Assembly, the person designated the next Prime Minister becomes the Acting Prime Minister, pending appointment by the President, 7 days after the vote.

Appointment of Prime Minister and other Ministers
(1) The President may, on the advice of the Prime Minister -

a appoint a deputy or senator to be a Minister; and

b terminate the appointment.

(2) The President may, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister -

a appoint a deputy or senator to be a Vice-Minister or junior Minister; and

b terminate the appointment.

Acting Prime Minister
(1) When the Prime Minister is absent from the Republic or otherwise unable to fulfil the duties of Prime Minister, or during a vacancy in the office of Prime Minister, an office-bearer in the order below acts as Prime Minister:

    a     The Deputy Prime Minister designated by the President on advice of the Prime Minister;

    b     A Minister designated by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister;

    c     A Minister designated by the President on the advice of the Cabinet;

    d     The Speaker, until the National Assembly designates one of its other members.

(2) An Acting Prime Minister has the responsibilities, powers and functions of the Prime Minister.

(3) Before assuming the responsibilities, powers and functions of the Prime Minister, the Acting Prime Minister must swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution, in accordance with Schedule 2.

Term of office of Ministers
(1) The appointment of the Prime Minister takes effect on the day specified in the instrument of appointment and terminates if they -

a cease to be a deputy;

b have their appointment terminated by the President;

c resign by writing delivered to the President; or

d when the National Assembly first meets after a general election;

e or (in the case of an Acting Prime Minister) when the Prime Minister resumes the powers and functions of his or her office.

(2) The appointment of a Minister, Vice-Minister or junior Minister  takes effect on the day specified in the instrument of appointment and terminates if they -

a cease to be a deputy or senator;

b have their appointment terminated by the President;

c resign by writing delivered to the President; or

d when the appointment of the Prime Minister terminates.

(3) A Prime Minister whose appointment is terminated must continue in office until a new Prime Minister is appointed if so requested by the President.

(4) A Minister whose appointment is terminated must continue in office until a new Minister is appointed if so requested by the President or the Prime Minister.

Conduct of ministerial business
(1) The President, in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, may, by instrument in writing, assign to the Prime Minister or any other Minister responsibility for the conduct (subject to this Constitution and any Act) of any ministerial business, including responsibility for the administration of any department of the Government.

(2) Ministers are responsible collectively and individually to the National Assembly for the exercise of their powers and the performance of their functions.

(3) Ministers must act in accordance with the Constitution; and provide the Parliament with full and regular reports concerning matters under their control.

Oath or affirmation of Ministers
(1) A member of the Executive Council must, before assuming office, swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution in accordance with Schedule 2.

(2) The Prime Minister and the other Ministers must, before assuming office, swear or affirm faithfulness to the Republic and obedience to the Constitution in accordance with Schedule 2.

(3) An oath or affirmation must be made before the President or a person authorised by the President to administer the oath or affirmation.

Remuneration of Ministers
The Prime Minister and the other Ministers must be paid such remuneration as may be fixed by or under Act.

The first biannual CFC/NaCoWriMo fun challenge brought forth four constitutions in various states of completion. Pretty good effort for a first run. We got three that included sortition, three that were parliamentary based and one that separated out the Executive. Lots of diversity there.

The time has come to cast your vote for the constitution you favoured! Poll inside.

The four constitutions were;

• Adam's Queensland Constitution which added an upper house (Qld is unicameral). Some of the innovations included were that the majority of the upper house were chosen by sortition, but included partisan and non-partisan appointees as well. Adam's constitution also contained the Governor as constitutional referee.
• Alan's Imaginary Constitution included A President as Head of State. The President was elected from the Citizen's Assembly - a sortitionist body. The Citizen's Body can also remove the President as allowed by the Constitution. Alan's Executive Council follows the Westminster model and formalised the position and role of the prime Minister (the PM is not mentioned in the current Australian constitution).
• Avocadia's Strong Westminster Constitution (my name/license for it). Avocadia formalises many of the implied aspects of responsible government in his constitution.
• Cam's Sortitionist's Constitution . This seeks to divide responsibility in the three branches of government as elected, specialist and sortitionist. The House of Representatives becomes a sortitionist body with some elected specialists present including the Treasurer. This constitution incorporates Avocadia's Australian Bill of Rights .

So go vote on which one you prefer.

Also a reminder for other's who have had their constitution writing skills and interests piqued by reading this, we will hold another Constitution Fun Challenge [CFC] later this year, so keep writing those constitutions, and you can enter it in the next CFC.

The Westminster system of the Executive Cabinet being embedded in Parliament grew from the need to route executive power away from the monarch while leaving the King with ceremonial authority. This is in contrast to the Washington system which separated the Executive entirely from Congress. The Westminster system, as practiced in Britain, also contains the upper house as a left over from the period when the King-Lord-Commons form of political philosophy dominated. Wentworth proposed this model for NSW when the colony was seeking self-government. Deniehy famously pilloried this illiberal model of government. Reform for the House of Lords in Britain is a common form of discussion, a new think-tank and advocacy group for a modern House of Lords has recently been formed, the Lords Reform Institute. They are proposing a sortitionist model.

Sortition

Sortition is the process of choosing public officials by lot. This is not a new technology, we have been using sortition to choose jurors for quite a long time now. Where this technology has not had traction is in selecting members of the three branches of government, Executive, Legislative or Judicial.

One of the arguments against sortition is that the parliamentary positions require specialists. This argument is true for the judicial branch, which often requires a great deal of legal knowledge to fully function efficiently, but in the legislative branch many members are professional politicians or party members, rather than specialist legislators.

The rise of lobbying in the US as the special interest legislators is a good example of politicians outsourcing the legislative process. This has accelerated in recent years as re-election requires more and more money in the US system. The Washington system of discipline in Congress has recently taken on Westminster characteristics, where legislation is made in the senior party leadership with party discipline - and threat of fiscal retribution - are used to ensure the party votes as a block.

An argument for sortition is the increasing education of the citizen population. When the American Republic was founded there was a great education gap between the elites of the time - Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison etc - and the regular citizen.

Today that gap is much smaller and many are as well educated, if not better, than the current leaders such as John Howard, George Bush or Tony Blair.

Due to British Columbia's [Canada] embrace of sortition for the creation of legislation that led to a referendum, we know have empirical evidence of public perception and reaction toward sortition in this context. Campbell Sharman writes;

The news media were initially skeptical about the ability of 'ordinary people' to become familiar with the complexities of electoral rules and their parliamentary consequences but, as the Assembly's meetings progressed, the tone of media reporting moved from mild condescension to admiration both for the substance and the tone of the Assembly's discussions.

The faith in 'ordinary people' being able to make decisions on complex political issues had been overwhelmingly endorsed. The public goodwill towards the Citizens' Assembly process was perhaps its most important achievement.

There was another curious emergent effect of using sortition and that was many voters cast ballot in the positive on the basis that they trusted the judgment of the 'ordinary people' in the Citizen's Assembly.

This is in direct contrast to Australia's experience in federal referendums where a campaign to 'not trust the bastards in Canberra' often works - and for good reason.

Lords Reform Institute Model

The Lords Reform Institute [LRI] contains their guide to reforming the house of lords which espouses the principles of improved representation and upper house independence. Given the hereditary and appointed nature of the House of Lords, any improvement in the selection process will increase democratic participation and outcomes in my opinion.

The LRI raises an important question relating to liberty;

There is a second question of principle involved, namely that of personal freedom. Jury service is compulsory, and any compulsion curtails the freedom of the person being compelled. We justify this in the case of jury service by saying the civic duty thus rendered is so valuable that it justifies taking perhaps a few weeks of their time.

The LRI solves this issue by removing the requirement for compulsion. They also argue for making service in a House of Jurors (to replace the house of lords) attractive with benefits such as good pay, advisors, administrative support and family relocation subsidy.

CFC Sortitionists

Sortition proved popular in South Sea Republic's recent Constitution Fun Challenge where readers were given the challenge of creating a constitution. There were four final entries, three of which were focused on the Australian Federal Government, with one state constitution for Queensland which currently lacks an upper-house. Of the four entries, three included sortitionist elements.

The interesting aspect was that those three applied sortition in different areas; I chose the house, adam chose the Senate and alan chose the executive to be chosen by lot.

Since the LRI is focusing on the upper-house, which in a bicameral parliamentary system is the only check and balance on the Executive from the legislative branch, it might be a good time to revisit adam's model.

4.

4.1 Small house of review

4.2 At least 20 members must be appointed by sortition from a pool of citizen nominees

4.3 At most 3 partisan and 3 non-partisan members may be appointed by the government of the day

4.4 Passes bills with a simple majority

4.5 The Legislative Council must be smaller than the Legislative Assembly

4.6 May not vote on money bills

4.7 May summon witnesses as before a court of law, and may delegate this power to committees

4.8 May instruct the Commission of Audit to investigate

4.9 Members serve for one year, but may choose to extend that service to 3 years

4.10 Any member may serve in the Legislative Council at most 10 years

4.11 Members are dismissed if they are

a. Convicted of a criminal offence

b. Dismissed by a two-thirds supermajority of the Legislative Council, which

is then confirmed by a simple majority of the Legislative Assembly

4.12 Members must be electors

This model is interesting in that it mixes appointed specialists with sortitionists. The issue of blocking supply is firmly in Australian Constitution memory and adam solves this by disqualifying the Legislative Council from voting on money bills.

The ratio of appointees to sortitionists is deliberate as well, as a super-majority can dismiss a councilor. A unanimous vote by the sortitionists can stop this process.

cam