Project Air5077 will be the Australian Air Force's (RAAF) Airborne Early Warning and Control component (AEW&C) of Australia's force projection. The Wedgetail is based on the 737-700 IGW platform with Boeing as the prime contractor in the project. The radar system is from Northrop-Grumman, while locally, BAE System Australia, Boeing Australia and Qantas Defence Systems are also involved.

The contracts and projects Boeing has been involved in with the USAF have come under congressional and media scrutiny recently. This is due to the inappropriate manner in which several of this projects were sought, priced and inflated. This has not been the case with the Wedgetail project. The project is under-budget, on-time and by the RAAF's determination, an extremely well managed project. The Wedgetail has also spawned interest from other nations that are seeking regional power projection; including Turkey, Korea and Italy.

The Wedgetail

Australia still has no AEW&C; system at its disposal, and is entirely reliant upon the United States for this capability. Australia has committed $3.4 billion for six Wedgetails to be delivered between 2006 and 2008. The first of this production line is already flying and being tested in the United State. In addition Australian industry is expected to be involved with $400 million of the project. The Boeing website explains the systems and capabilities of the Wedgetail;

The AEW&C; system combines the new high-performance Boeing 737-700 IGW aircraft with the Northrop Grumman Multi-role Electronically Scanned Array (MESA) radar. Included in the platform are an advanced identification friend or foe (IFF) system; an expanded, passive surveillance system; a flexible, open-system architecture and a highly effective self-defense capability. The 737-700 features state-of-the-art avionics, navigation equipment and flight deck. It has a maximum speed of .78 Mach and an operational ceiling of 41,000 feet.

The Wedgetail's name comes from the radar wedge on the rear of the aircraft. This is from Northrop Grumman's MESA technologies which can track air and sea targets simultaneously. The radar also does not have a sweep, so the objects being tracked do not "jump" on the screen. The Wiki entry describes the the radar's capability;

The radar is located on a dorsal fin on top of the fuselage, dubbed the "top hat", and is designed for minimal aerodynamic effect. The radar is capable of simultaneous air and sea search, fighter control and area search. Other modifications include ventral fins to counterbalance the radar and countermeasures mounted on the nose, wingtips and tail. The cabin features 8 operator consoles with sufficient space for 4 more, the Australian fleet will operate 10 consoles with space for 2 more.

The contract included the options for three other aircraft above the initial order of four. Since the radar systems and mission equipment were paid for in the original contract, adding additional aircraft was quite cheap by defence procurement standards. The AEW&Cs; are also very important force multipliers that dramatically increase the effectiveness of forward assets. Consequently Australia took the options for two more, bringing the Australian fleet to six.

The question needs to be asked why the option on a third was not taken. Since Australia's fleet is quite small, and the importance of the AEW&C; as a force multiplier to the Australian Defence Force (ADF); adding a seventh AEW&C; system would have increased the ADF's effectiveness considerably.

Reforming No.2 Squadron RAAF

No.2 Squadron has been reformed specifically for the Wedgetails. The squadron headquarters is currently at Williamtown in NSW. The Australian government has invested $149 million into Williamtown to support the needs of the Wedgetails. No.2's history can be traced back to the Australian Flying Corps when it was formed in the Middle East. The squadron flew DH5 and SE5a aircraft in the skies of France.

The squadron found itself in the bomber role in World War II, flying Lockheed Hudson's and B25's in the South Pacific. The squadron was later equipped with the Australian built GAF Lincolns, large four engined bombers armed with 20mm cannon. These were used in the Malayan Emergency. The squadron was later equipped with GAF Canberras and deployed to Vietnam. With the retirement of the Canberra, the squadron was disbanded as No.1 Squadron and No.6 Squadron, armed with the F111 provided the RAAF's strike and bomber capabilities.

Innovative RAAF RFP's

The 737-700 IGW Wedgetail is not the first Australian defence RFP that has led to an innovative result. It also not the first Australian initiated project that was used by other forces facing a similar situation. In 1926, Richard Williams was faced with equipping a seaplane carrier, HMAS Albatross, with aircraft - aircraft which the RAAF did not have. Williams, along with H.C. Harisson drew up an RFP for an amphibian aircraft that solved this need.

Supermarine was part of Vickers in the 1930's and rose to the challenge; requesting that the wings be wood and fabric rather than metal. After failing an initial catapult test, the Supermarine Walrus was operationally tested on HMS Nelson. Williams ordered twenty-four for Australia, the Royal Navy (RN) and Royal Air Force (RAF) ordered approximately seven hundred and eighty.

The Wedgetail project has raised interest with South Korea, Turkey and Italy. This raises the point that Australia is not alone in its regional projection and technology needs. The United States and Britain have moved to global projection - Australia's more modest needs are popular with other nations seeking only regional projection.

There is an opportunity here for Australian defence industries, but it will require the political will as well as funding from the Australian Government and Australian Defence Force. One of Richard Williams' innovative insights was that Australian solutions to Australian problems are superior. The Australian Government would do well to heed that philosophy.

cam

Sea of Sands covers Senator Hill's comment that a new Defence White Paper was not necessary. The Defence White Paper from 2000 covers Australian strategic doctrine and serves as the basis for capability, readiness, procurement and deployment. The previous white paper was before the terrorist attacks on America in 2001. Since then the United States has chosen to pursue terrorism as a military objective - and Australia has joined them in this. We now have several years experience in combating terrorism from a military point of view, what can be learnt from it, and should we reassess our doctrine in a 2005 Defence White Paper?

Senator Hill

Senator Hill is the Minister for Defence. In a recent interview he was asked, "Why do we need a new defence white paper?" He doesn't answer the question but claims that the 2000 white paper and documents based off of it remain relevant;

Because I think that the 2000 paper is still fundamentally sound, I think it's been updated in 2003 with greater focus been given to WMD and global terrorism and as I said to some internal issues of nation buildings within our own regions. The DCP the Defence Capability Plan was written pursuant to that white paper and refined pursuant to the update. I think it addresses the strategic environment as we find it and I don't think the distraction of going back into another sort of intellectual debate will actually contribute to the better practical outcomes, I think our challenge at the moment is to deliver on the white paper and not to be distracted from that task.

One aspect of not having the process for a new white paper initiated is that it removes debate away from the public and allows the government to act with impunity in that area. I dislike his use of the word distraction. If the people want to debate this, then they should. Distraction for whom? I think it is political-speak for avoiding accountability and public scrutiny of policy.

Australian defence doctrine for the Howard government is based upon;

• 2000 Defence White Paper 2000
• 2003 Defence Update
• Defence Capability Plan

2000 Defence White Paper

This document recognises globalisation and US strategic primacy as the strongest shapers of the international strategic environment. The paper states that;

These [two] factors will help strengthen global security and promote economic, social and political developments that align with Australia's interests and values.

The White Paper also claims that Australia is a secure country, courtesy of our geo-political isolation, our good relations with our neighbours and being in a relatively benign region that has a low probability of conflict. It also states our strong alliance with the US is another reason for our security. The document also notes that there has been an arms race on in South-East Asia, of which Australia has contributed to with its procurements.

It states that our primary interest remains protecting Australia and it direct approaches - the air-sea gap - but the document makes many tips of the hat to multi-lateral expeditions. The military strategy is the weakest part of the white paper, and where the government has not delivered on its promises in 2000. The paper claims three principles in military strategy;

1. self-reliance : Being able to defend Australia without relying on the combat forces of other countries.
2. maritime strategy : Controlling the air and sea approaches to Australia. These are the North-West shelf, the Timor Sea and the Coral Sea.
3. proactive operations : The ability to strike hostile forces far from the Australian shore.

In the first issue, we still lease space time from the US. Our command and control ability is limited, though the AEW&C aircraft coming will improve that. We still have limited surveillance systems, enough that we aren't quite sure what is coming and going on our northern coastline.

On the second issue, why are we thinking of buying LHDs and AWDs? These are the big-ticket items of an expeditionary force. Not a force for controlling the air-sea gap. An LHD is a big fat stupid slow target that is unable to defend Australia. An AWD is only good for defending big fat stupid slow targets from attack. Get rid of the LHD and we don't need the AWD.

The big issue with the air-sea gap is the drop in strike capability with the impending retirement of the F111. Even with the purchase of cruise missiles, and the collapse of the strike platform into the JSF we are still going to suffer a drastic loss of projection and strike power. We either need to buy more JSFs, replace and purchase more Air to Air Refuelling (AAR) assets, or look to a disruptive technology to replace the F111.

(M|T)UAVs are one candidate, but they are actually more expensive to operate than a normal aircraft. They have three shifts and labour costs are a considerable cost of any weapon system.

The third is a bit ambiguous but suggests that the Australian Defence Force (ADF) be able to maintain capability and tempo far from the Australia. In these instances airlift ability and logistical capability become paramount. Here the ADF has suffered neglect as well. The HMAS Jervis Bay was leased from Incat for the East Timor deployment. Australian airlift ability has suffered decay - the Caribou needs replacement, as do the older C130 aircraft.

The ADF needs the addition of a more capable and larger platform, such as the Boeing C17, to airlift larger loads over longer distances. To support the wider logistical lines that expeditionary forces require, more AAR assets will be needed and the consequent JSF forces to protect those AAR aircraft.

The 2000 White Paper also recognizes other priorities for the ADF include contributing to the security of the immediate neighbourhood, with deployments such as East Timor and the Solomons; but also contributing to our neighbours defence, plus low level operations such as evacuations and relief. The white paper also states that the ADF should be able contribute to international coalition forces for expeditions and issues beyond Australia's immediate neighbourhood.

Other mention in the document are that it was determined that a brigade level force was the largest that needed to be maintained in an expedition and that a battalion needs to be in a state of readiness for deployment elsewhere. The deployments in Iraq, East Timor, the Solomons and other UN commitments have put pressure on this.

In terms of procurement the 2000 white paper points to AAR assets being replaced, which has not happened yet. It also claims the F111 will be maintained until 2020. The F111 is now planned to be retired in 2010. There are also several warnings on Australia's defence status. As the South-East Asian region is increasing in prosperity it is also increasing in complexity and sophistication of its military forces.

Australia no longer has a regional monopoly on beyond visual range systems, and other forces are also deploying AEW&C assets. The challenge for Australia will be to incorporate those international assets into ensuring a multi-national desire for stability in the South and North Pacific.

Central to conservative (Liberal) military doctrine is the Au-US alliance, which all too often under conservative government ends up with Australia having an uncritical policy toward America. In 2000 the ANZUS Treaty was defined as giving;

But for the past 50 years ANZUS has given the [Au-US alliance] relationship shape, depth and weight. The Treaty remains today the foundation of a relationship that is one of our great national assets.

Howard enacted the treaty after the September 11th attacks - partly to keep this out of date Cold War document relevant. This document is the fiction that the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine is founded on. it is not a basis for a foreign policy, nor a military policy.

2003 Defence Update

The 2003 paper is an effort to update the 2000 White Paper to take into account the changes in the strategic environment since the 2001/2002 terrorist attacks. the foreward claims;

What is already clear is that while the Defence White Paper focused on the development of capabilities for the Defence of Australia and its National Interests, two matters - terrorism and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD], including to terrorists - have emerged to new prominence and create renewed strategic uncertainty. In addition, some adverse trends in our immediate neighbourhood have continued.

The changed strategic and security environment requires responses from a number of government agencies.

There are two issues there. Terrorism and WMDs. Firstly, the United States chose to pursue terrorism as a military issue. They invaded Afghanistan, then set-up a deceitful campaign to justify the invasion of Iraq. The capture of suspected terrorists has led to the United States detaining suspects as "enemy-combatants", outside of civil law and under military legal systems and process. There is no doubt the US is seeking a military solution to terrorism.

Is this justified? In my opinion no. Terrorism remains a civil issue. For Australia it is actually a foreign policy issue. Indonesia has been taking the punches of terrorism aimed at Australia. Indonesia has been handling it admirably - catching the terrorists and bringing them to justice in civil courts of law. By comparison the American military has not been able to bring Osama Bin Laden to justice yet.

The failure for Australian politicians has been the reliance on the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy. It has left us with a weakened Prime Minister who can do nothing other than offer uncritical support for the United States and its military pursuit of terrorism.

The other premise of this report is the Weapons of Mass Destruction. This has become a vogue term since President Bush used at is the fulcrum spin in his deceitful campaign to justify the invasion of Iraq. It is a fear based term - designed to linguistically evoke horror in the population. We have had threats from technological weapons at the individual level (non nation-state) - nuclear, biological etc right through the cold war. I do not believe this is a new issue. This is political fashion and a consequence of "fear and feel-good" politics.

2003 Strategic Environment

The 2003 document makes the point that the posture the United States has taken against terrorism has inflamed anti-Americanism, not just in Muslim states. The strength of the United States and the defeat of Communism has made the defence relationships between major-states more secure. But the areas of the North Pacific and the Middle East - which are important economic regions for Australia - are more volatile than in 2000.

The 2003 document also aligns Australian military expeditionary doctrine with American strategy. For instance the Afghanistan invasion is described as;

The important role of military force in the War on Terror has been demonstrated in Afghanistan. The removal of the Taliban regime - Al Qaida's host - has eliminated one of the world's most oppressive governments and given the people of Afghanistan the chance of a better future. Information gained has added to our understanding of terrorist networks and disrupted planned attacks. Importantly, Al Qaida has lost its unhindered access to terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. But actions in disrupting Al Qaida's operations in Afghanistan are just the first step. Much remains to be done and some further resort to military force is likely to be needed.

This does not explain the invasion in terms of a nation-state refusing to turn over a suspected terrorist responsible for the September 11th attacks. Australian doctrine describes it as removing a regime and bringing a future to a nation. With this Australia is saying that it supports a military solution - not civil justice for perpetrators of crimes.

Yet in contradiction, we have the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) which is the basis of civil pursuit of terrorism regionally. Australia played a prominent role in this, and it has been successful in keeping terrorism down regionally. The MOU is also more closely aligned with Australian values. The only conclusion that can be reached is that we would be pursing this same policy in the Middle East, except for our uncritical support of America.

Further examples that Australia sees terrorism as requiring a military solution is the expansion of the Special Forces, the establishment of a Special Operations Command and creating a Tactical Assault Group. In the case of a terrorist attack on Australia, it will be the military stepping in, not the State Police Forces. I think this is a gross misuse of federal power. The civil authorities at the state level should be the ones establishing the knowledge, skills and readiness for this. This is another example of the over-reach of federal power.

2003 Update Conclusion

The 2003 Update is a pretty weak document. It justifies the Missile Defence project with North Korea and Iraq's WMDs. The latter was false and North Korea still does not have the capability to achieve Australia with missiles, despite Downer's claim to the contrary. The paper also makes the distinction that it supports a military solution to terrorism at home and abroad, except in South-East Asia, where it will pursue a civil multi-lateral course.

At home the Special Operations Command and Tactical Assault Group point to the federal government deploying the military domestically if there is a terrorist attack on Australian soil. There is no mention of changes in procurement for the ADF, there is also no mention of any changes in Infantry readiness and sustainability with the deployments (in 2003) of the ADF on expeditions. A constant warning cry has been that the Army needs more diggers to meet the deployments being asked of them by the Howard government. This was not addressed.

Also not addressed were the Air Warfare Destroyers and whether they have any role in a strategic doctrine that is dominated by sustained expeditions. The logistical issues with sustained multinational deployments are also not mentioned. The Howard government has been in power for over eight years now, and has constantly deployed the ADF in an expeditionary mode, but so far has failed to address Australia's airlift capability and its brown-blue water logistical capability.

Defence Capability Plan

The Defence Capability Plan (DCP) represents an updating of the Defence Capability Plan outlined in the 2000 White Paper and now represents the capital investment from 2004 through to 2014. The DCP lists a large number of projects and phases of upgrades to existing platforms as well as the procurement of new platforms.

The DCP divides the project responsibilities into;

• Aerospace (AIR)
• Maritime (SEA)
• Vehicles and Land (LAND)
• Weapons and Munitions
• Electronic Systems

Consistent with the increase of the military budget under the Howard Government, as well as the increased tempo and deployment of the ADF in the last eight years, the projected expenditure on military projects in all of the above five areas has increased through to 2010. The Aerospace industry sector is receiving the largest amount of the budget, with close to 45%. The next largest is the Maritime industry with approx 25% and then the Vehicles and Land area.

Most of the aviation platforms are receiving Electronics Warfare upgrades. These projects are largely integration of American technologies and have little development role for Australian industry. This is common across all projects in all defence sectors. There is no technology sharing of significance when integrating outside technology.

Some of the projects in the DCP include;

• AIR5418 - Air-to-Surface long range stand off missile capability for the F18 and P3C Orion. (350M-450M)
• AIR6000 - The JSF project. (11.5B-15.5B)
• AIR7000 - P3C replacement possibility project with potential for MUAV as maritime patrol. (750M-1B)
• JP90 - Updating the combat identification system. (150M-200M)
• JP126 - Reassessment of logistical needs from expeditionary deployment pressures. (150M-200M)
• JP2044 - Space based surveillance capability. (50M-75M)
• JP2069 - High grade cryptographic equipment.
• JP5408 - GPS enhancement and risk study.
• LAND112 - ASLAV Enhancement. (200M-250M)
• LAND907 - Battle tank replacement. This is the RFP that got the Abrams in the door.(450M-600M)
• SEA1439 - Collins improvement program. (600M-800M)
• SEA4000 - Air Warfare Destroyer

Noticeable for its absence in the DCP is a project for increasing AAR capability.Nor is their any mention of increasing the airlift ability of the fixed-wing complement of the ADF. Our space based ability is still lacking, despite the technology and equipment for that commoditizing. The capitalisation for space based communications is low enough that individuals can afford it, and it is no longer the exclusive domain of nation-states.

There is also no project looking at the possibility or need of Australia to expand its infantry to meet the requirement of sustained rule-of-law deployments the Howard Government has conducted. The rule-of-law deployments are human capital intensive. The 2000 paper required the ADF to be able to support a brigade overseas and have a battalion in readiness for deployment. There is no mention if this is currently being met.

Do We Need a 2005 Defence White Paper?

My answer is yes. We need a debate as a nation on how we want to pursue the eradication of terrorism on the globe. The American military response to terrorism has had more downs than ups. If the US wasn't such a military and economic power they would be internationally isolated now.

The 2003 Update shows Australia has adopted the American approach to terrorism and seeks a military solution at home and abroad. We have adopted the legal tactics of terrorists being outside of civil liberties, we have invaded Iraq on a deceitful premise and we have implemented new structures in the ADF to provide a military response to terrorist attacks in Australia.

In counter to this, we have developed multi-lateral civil response with our neighbours to combat terrorism. This has had more success in tempering terrorism than our military interventions in the Middle East. It is my belief that Australians far more approve of the civil response to terrorism that we have pursued with Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Re-opening the debate on defence will determine if we as a nation believe that a multi-lateral civil response is more effective as well.

This public debate on how we should seek an environment free from terrorism will have direct influence on the procurement for the ADF.

cam

The Australian has a pre-release discussion of it. No mention of the report, or its impending release from the defence website media room .

From the article;

The Prime Minister all but gave a guarantee yesterday that cabinet will soon approve a continuation of the 3per cent real increase in the defence budget beyond 2010, which will mean billions of extra dollars for the military.

That will probably only stave off inflationry pressures. IIRC the ADF gets about 17 billion a year, so a three percent increase comes in at 510 million. To put that in comparison, last election the money that was "found" in the budget and used for electoral bribes was 6 Billion.

The update envisages that new military capabilities -- including a larger, more mobile and better protected army, together with the navy's new amphibious ships and air warfare destroyers -- could contribute to coalition operations further away from Australia's neighbourhood. The blueprint details regional military trends, including China's military modernisation, India's rise and the US's future military posture in East Asia.

So the Navy is getting their 30,000 tonne LHD behemoths. I am interested to see their strategic and doctrinal justification for both the LHD and AWDs.

He said any new Australian commitment to Iraq would depend on Japan, Britain and the views of the new Iraqi government after this month's elections.

America will make that decision for us. Iraq is becoming politically untenable in the US. It will leave us no choice.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute [ASPI] has had a bit of a monopoly on defence policy over the last few years. It has been especially influential, the "Our Failing Neighbour" report leading directly to the Australian operation in the Solomons. Another defence think-tank has popped up and started appearing in the mass-media with a jingoistic name - the Kokoda Foundation .

The ASPI charges for their PDFs which immediately removes them from the citizen commentary arena. Currently that means blogs. Since I am one of the few who writes on Australian defence issues, I emailed them asking the ASPI to treat me as a journalist and send me the PDFs without charge. They declined. It should be noted the ASPI is funded by the government. Which suggests citizens should have access to their research papers.

One of the main sponsors of the Kokoda Foundation is the Australian Department of Defence. It looks like the Kokoda Foundation is following the ASPI in putting the executive summary up on the web, but to read the entire report requires buying a hard copy. This is a dumb decision. When the ASPI had their PDFs on the net, without charge, I wrote of them often , and in detail.

Australia has a history of naval shipbuilding, which, as a heavy industry began with WWI and Cockatoo Island. Between the wars Cockatoo Island produced HMAS Albatros. After the war ship-building expanded to Williamstown with the Daring-class though John Jeremy argues that the main contribution of Australian shipyards was "in ship repair and conversion and the construction of small ships."

More recently we have seen the large projects of the ANZAC Frigates, Collins-class Attack Submarines and the Huon-class be built in Australian shipyards as well as the ongoing repair, conversions and production of smaller ships. Unlike Australian aerospace which was largely shut down in the 1970s, the maritime industry continues to have strong support from government defence contracts.

There is no doubt that defence expenditure acts as a nationalist subsidy, unfortunately, Australia has traditionally used that subsidy for procurement or manufacturing, rather than science, engineering or high-tech. By comparison the US subsidises it scientists and engineers by mammoth amounts in their defence budget.

From this point of view I am unsure why Australia chose to persist with the maritime industries rather than aerospace, despite both being complex industries. Probably because local maritime companies, manufacturers and producers were a better lobby than the aerospace industries. Or alternatively, external salesmen were better lobbyists than the local ones. Even now much of of Australian defence technology is integrating American technology rather than the development, or R&D, of indigenous Australian technology.

I think Australia should invest in high-tech through defence in a sustained manner. Increasing technology is the best arbiter for improved productivity. Economists such as Nicholas Gruen and Andrew Leigh have argued increased productivity is the best predictor of increasing salary/wages in the local economy. Another reason is the uber-nationalism of defence. It is a means of central subsidy in such a way that external treaty agreements or bodies cannot stop; such as the WTO. However the subsidy to defence must be sustained over a long period.

Senator Mark Bishop in a speech argued that the sustained and contiguous nature of indigenous defence development is key:

The biggest single problem with Defence procurement is that Defence is a monopsony--that is, a single or sole purchaser. The history of Defence procurement is one of industry capture, inefficiency, poor specification, overspending and serious time delays. On top of that, purchases are often ad hoc and of a limited time span. Our past naval shipbuilding is just another example of that, and the responsibility for that poor state of affairs really needs to be sheeted home to government.

In my view, there are three critical factors for a viable industry on a long-term basis: firstly, continuity of Defence demand; secondly, long product runs, which give you economies of scale; and, thirdly, long-term planning. I believe the government has failed all of these critical needs. The decision on new ships should have been made five or even seven years ago. The mix of ships should have been more numerous for economies of scale purchases. Plans should already be on the drawing board for the next generation of ships.

It does seem clear that, with the frigates project at least, a sound level of cost effectiveness might have been achieved, but only because we produced 10 units--that is, we got the savings on the production run through economies of scale because of the volume of production. That again is the experience all around the world with commercial shipping. It applies equally to naval shipping. What we have here is a decision for just three AWDs and two LHDs.

Through sheer experience we know these projects, in isolation, cannot be viable. We would certainly like to see the economic analysis and the benchmarking which has been done, if any has been done. We do not decry the decision to build in Australia. But it is simply tragic that a serious effort has not been made to ensure the re-establishment of a long-term industry as part of that plan. To be blunt, responsibility stops there with the government.

The other issue that Mark Bishop raises is that many of the defence procurement choices are political, which is never good for efficiency.

I think there is a role for Australian spending on research and development within large projects - and not necessarily limited to maritime - as seems to be the current fashion. Far more money should be poured into aerospace and telecommunication for sustained periods. We may even find disruptive technologies popping out locally - like an Australian version of DARPAnet. It is worth the investment.

cam

Since the links to the Hansard's bust almost immediately, and I referenced the speech in, Naval Building in Australia : this is Mark Bishop's speech reproduced in full.

First the definition of monopsony . The speech is from here ;

I rise to make a few remarks about the report that has just been tabled by the Chair of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Senator Johnston. Since this inquiry's inception, it has been hoped that it would better inform the parliament on a potentially significant part of Australia's manufacturing industry. The stimulus for the inquiry was the government's decision to build three air warfare destroyers in Australia. These are to be followed by two amphibious ships which, at this stage, are of unknown construction, design and location. These are very large ships, the likes of which have not been built in Australia for decades, so naturally there are questions about industry capacity and cost relativities. The purpose of the inquiry, however, was not to delve into the strategic decisions to build these types of vessels. Those were government decisions, and they were a given; hence the committee's strict concentration on its limited terms of reference, which were essentially economic in nature.

I have appended to the report my own views on the subject. Whilst my views are certainly not inconsistent with the broader report, there are some matters of emphasis that are worth considering. I will therefore make the following points for the record. We on this side believe that, just as we have a vibrant small shipbuilding industry, we should also be able to develop more at the heavy or larger end. We have the skills, the workforce and a very capable heavy engineering sector. We also need to boost our manufacturing sector and, in that respect, the defence industry is potentially a key. The nature of shipbuilding has changed. We no longer have big yards, but flexible fabricators of many tasks--some offshore, some small ship fabricators, some involved in ship repair and fabrication, and some that manufacture mining equipment and the like. The old model of large yards doing all work on site is dead all around the world, and few can hope to compete with China, India and South Korea at the large end of the commercial shipbuilding market.

It is also clear that, if we are to have a capacity, it must be limited to one central assembly yard--and modular sections from a competitive supply market. We note that this trend is already emerging, and South Australia, in a de facto sense, appears to be the location chosen by government for this central assembly point--although there are very useful developments in terms of a joint user facility in Western Australia.

One of the most difficult issues in naval shipbuilding is that it is surrounded by a range of assertions and shibboleths, including: that self sufficiency is needed, that naval ships are somehow different from commercial ships, that defence security justifies all sorts of expense, that all governments protect their naval industry and that there are large ongoing economic spin-offs. These considerations, in my view, are only relevant to a degree. In making a decision to have a local build, several matters need to be considered. Steel fabrication is only 20 per cent of the value of naval ships these days. The biggest portion, by value, is weaponry systems, systems integration and fit-out.

Competitive costs are fundamental, but what is the exact premium if we are going to have a local build? What is the state of the economy? Can it sustain large ad hoc investments? What is the state of the international shipbuilding market? What is the status of our alliances with respect to intellectual property and security? What is the state of our heavy engineering industry? Is it capable? Is it stretched? Is there spare capacity? What is the status of the labour market? Do we have the manpower and do we have the right skills mix, particularly at a technical and engineering level? Putting nationalism aside, these are rational questions that need sensible, calculated and verifiable answers.

The biggest single problem with Defence procurement is that Defence is a monopsony--that is, a single or sole purchaser. The history of Defence procurement is one of industry capture, inefficiency, poor specification, overspending and serious time delays. On top of that, purchases are often ad hoc and of a limited time span. Our past naval shipbuilding is just another example of that, and the responsibility for that poor state of affairs really needs to be sheeted home to government.

In my view, there are three critical factors for a viable industry on a long-term basis: firstly, continuity of Defence demand; secondly, long product runs, which give you economies of scale; and, thirdly, long-term planning. I believe the government has failed all of these critical needs. The decision on new ships should have been made five or even seven years ago. The mix of ships should have been more numerous for economies of scale purchases. Plans should already be on the drawing board for the next generation of ships.

It does seem clear that, with the frigates project at least, a sound level of cost effectiveness might have been achieved, but only because we produced 10 units--that is, we got the savings on the production run through economies of scale because of the volume of production. That again is the experience all around the world with commercial shipping. It applies equally to naval shipping. What we have here is a decision for just three AWDs and two LHDs.

Through sheer experience we know these projects, in isolation, cannot be viable. We would certainly like to see the economic analysis and the benchmarking which has been done, if any has been done. We do not decry the decision to build in Australia. But it is simply tragic that a serious effort has not been made to ensure the re-establishment of a long-term industry as part of that plan. To be blunt, responsibility stops there with the government.

The risk is that these enormous investment decisions, totalling billions of dollars, have been made solely on the ground of local political advantage. If the government is concerned about the excessive premium for local building, that is the direct result of its short-term decision making and limited vision in this area. This inquiry, despite its limitations, has shown that given certain conditions a competitive naval shipbuilding industry might be viable in Australia, and that is assuming that the economic modelling has been done. If it has not, it should be. Taxpayers deserve better than to have billions of dollars thrown at projects of dubious value and excessive cost.

We believe that model should be designed now and applied rigorously to both these projects and future projects. Further, we believe that that model should be totally transparent and subject to full audit and public scrutiny. If we do not knuckle down on this issue now and do that type of analysis, we will continue to be plagued by the same problem for another generation. In that context, the opposition was pleased to sign up to the report and make it unanimous.

My final comments go to the considerable assistance provided by the committee secretary, Dr Dermody, and the two research officers, Dr Richard Grant and Ms Lisa Fenn. They had extensive work to do in preparation, research, analysis and organisation. Their input has been valuable. It should be noted on the public record that they have provided fine support to the chair of the committee and to members of the committee who were, by and large, actively involved in nearly all deliberations. Finally, I wish to also support the comments of the chair and acknowledge the support of the Minister for Defence, the Prime Minister and the head of the DMO, Dr Gumley, who were sufficiently prepared to recommend funding for the committee to visit the United States and South Korea to examine local shipyards on the ground.

The US Deputy Defence Secretary has written Brendan Nelson to say that the F22 will not be offered as an export to Australia. The F22 is one of two fifth generation platforms, the JSF is the other, and more than a few in politics and policy have argued for the F22 instead of the JSF to be the RAAF's next platform.

Yesterday the ASPI released a policy document authored by Andrew Davies that was titled: The generation gap: Australia and the Super Hornet by Andrew Davies . In it Davies argues that the Super Hornet is a poor option, and the four billion spent on it might be better spent on keeping the F111 in service until the fifth generation fighter becomes available or operational.

Davies also argues that the F22 might become a more cost competitive answer to Australia's projection issues, as we would not be buying an early version, and know the cost overruns - something that remains uncertain with the JSF. However the letter from the US Deputy of Defence puts a kabosh on that. He writes:

We also need to understand that, no matter what we do, we lose significant capability when the F-111 retires. No other aircraft (including the Super Hornet, Raptor and JSF) has its range and load carrying capability. Effectively each F-111 provides better than twice the combat effect of smaller aircraft like the JSF or the Super Hornet. For that reason, it might well be worth looking at how many years extra service we could get from them for part of the four billion dollars that the Super Hornets would cost. That might be a more cost-effective way of avoiding a capability gap.

This is Australia's real problem. For the first time in the RAAF's history a new platform will decrease our capability, not improve it.

The Australasian Legal Information Institute has the decision for the Thomas vs Mowbray up on its website. This is over control orders and whether they are constitutional under Defence Powers. The other arguments against the control order is that it gives a non-judicial power to a court and it is not supported under the heads of power in the Constitution.

Firstly IANAL, so hopefully I am not reading or summarising the decision incorrectly. Gleeson writes:

I agree with Gummow and Crennan JJ that, subject to questions 1 and 2, the legislation is supported by the defence power and the external affairs power. It is therefore unnecessary to deal with the arguments concerning the references of matters by the States.

The extent, if any, to which other anti-terrorist provisions of the Criminal Code depend upon the references by the States does not arise for consideration. I also agree with the reasons given by Gummow and Crennan JJ for their conclusion as to question 3, and would add only some brief points on that topic.

By making terrorism a 'defence' and 'external affairs' power it now becomes the domain of the national government and potentially one that can have martial responses - not civil ones. This potentially paves the way for the militarization of terror responses domestically. This is basically the High Court agreeing with the Government's military responses in this area such as the ADF having a terror response group and the use of the military in Iraq as a claimed extension to a war on terror.

It might be wise to compare how our northern neighbour - who has had two significant terror attacks on its soil - dealt with the problem. Indonesia did so through police work and then the judicial system. It was totally above board and appears to have quelled that type of activity. It is doubly remarkable as under Suharto there was no police force, only the military police.

I don't think Australia will militarise totally of course, but it gives this government and future governments - or more accurately the executive - the option of doing so where it suits their purpose.

Gleeson continues:

The power to make laws with respect to the naval and military defence of the Commonwealth and of the several States, and the control of the forces to execute and maintain the laws of the Commonwealth, is not limited to defence against aggression from a foreign nation; it is not limited to external threats; it is not confined to waging war in a conventional sense of combat between forces of nations; and it is not limited to protection of bodies politic as distinct from the public, or sections of the public.

So defence as a head of power is now redefined as any violence against the public. Defence has become domestically oriented such that violence in Australia can now have a martial response. This line has been blurred for a while; for instance we use 500 million dollar battle Frigates to pick up refugees. Prior to the use of the Frigates for this work, classes of RAN Patrol Boats were built specifically for that function.

The ADF is one of the few bodies that maintains a constant long-haul and logistical capacity, so it is often used for supply and specialist skills support. For instance ADF personnel were deployed in the recent Indigenous issues emergency - not trigger pullers, but support staff. Rather than just helping with Bush Fires, the ADF is being used more and more by the Executive in domestic policy.

The definition of terrorism as per the act is:

The object of Div 104 is to allow obligations, prohibitions and restrictions to be imposed on a person by a control order for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist act (s 104.1).

The definition of terrorist act (s 100.1) requires three elements for an action or threat of action to be a terrorist act. First, the action must fall within a certain description, and must not be of a kind excluded by another description. The inclusory aspect of the definition is that the action must (to put it briefly) cause death, serious physical harm, or serious damage to property, endanger life, create a serious risk to public health or safety, or seriously interfere with or disrupt certain vital systems. The exclusory aspect of the definition excludes advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action that is (to put it briefly) not intended to cause death or serious injury, or endanger life or public safety.

The second necessary element is that the action is done, or the threat of action is made, with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. The third necessary element is that the action is done, or the threat of action is made, with the intention of coercing, or influencing by intimidation (to put it briefly), a government, or of intimidating the public or a section of the public.

This is why it was not necessary to claim the authority for the control order through the defence or external affairs head of power. Violence in this manner is a criminal act - not a martial one. When I say that terrorism is a civil matter I mean non-martial. There is no need to bring in a potential military reading into what is a constitutional decision that has the effect of expanding allowable national constitutional practice.

It is just flat-out unnecessary.

If a control order is necessary to protect against civil disorder from someone who has admitted to Al Queda training then it should be argued as constitutional under criminal or civil law; not defence powers.

To jump outside of the constitutional issues for a minute: on the issue of the control order, I am comfortable with it personally if it is issued by the Attorney-General (executive) and approved by the Judicial (federal court) with a sunsetting period of three months. The other check and balance I would add in there is that the individual under the control order can sue the executive to have it over-turned or removed. I think the judicial is an effective apolitical and impartial arbiter in this area and combined with a sunsetting on the order will stop permanent suspension of liberties.

The problem is that it may be used for political purposes to vilify individuals, smear them through the power of government and restrict their liberties unreasonably. Simply because of the political nature of terrorism this is always going to be an issue. However, we recognise as a reasonable society that sometimes specific control orders are necessary, such as in domestic violence , where maybe there isn't enough evidence for a criminal conviction.

Other than the misreading of control orders being justified constitutionally as defence and external affairs powers I don't have too much of an issue with the decision.

It looks like Kerby and Heydon wrote opinions in addition to Gleeson's. I will try and go through them in other posts.