Gary Sauer-Thompson discusses the complexity of issues to do with Afghanistan, Iraq and the Australian relationship with the United States. It is a curious nexus of politics, morality and foreign policy doctrines in navigating a path of least dissatisfaction through through the three areas.
Democratically and militarily Australia cannot completely rebuff the US in Afghanistan and Iraq. Australia is too reliant on America for the continuance of Australian military power. Democratically there is a strong conservative media that idealizes the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine who have to be placated, not to mention a significant enough constituency that concurs on the policy.
There is the politics as well. As Hugh White writes Rudd wants to disengage from Iraq while maintaining the relationship with the US. White writes:
Hence Rudd's dilemma. He wants to do the Bush administration some favours, but he is reluctant to send more troops to Iraq. The compromise seems to be that he and his colleagues will urge the Europeans to do more without promising that Australia will do more itself.White argues that strategically Afghanistan is of no interest to Australia, and he is correct. As he noted extremists are operating in Pakistan now, and the likelihood of Afghanistan transitioning to a secular free-market democracy are slim. The main difference is morality. Afghanistan is easier to swallow from a moral point of view than Iraq is. We went into Afghanistan to bring Osama Bin Laden to justice for his crimes against humanity. For that reason alone it is more morally palatable than Iraq is, the latter which was predicated on fraud, propaganda and incompetence. I think this is why the Rudd Government will choose to focus on Afghanistan in their policy.
Is Australia in Iraq for oil or is it because of the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine [GAPF] of foreign policy? In my opinion, while energy security plays a minor role, it is predominantly because of the latter. (more)
One of the claims of the 'Great and powerful friends' doctrine [GAPF] of foreign policy is that it brings economic benefits to the smaller partner from the powerful friend. This stems back to Billy Hughes in 1919 being concerned that if Australia was seen as disloyal to Britain, then Canada would get privileged access to the British wheat markets. Which was a false assumption to base a foreign policy upon. Today the Free Trade Agreement [FTA] is being touted as an example of the GAPF working to Australia's benefit. It is worth reflecting if this is true. (more)
Great and Powerful Friends doctrine, International liberalism and the Engagement doctrine. (more)
# adam commented : Engagement: I suspect Engagement is not so much a disruptive technology as an older technique used for creating a peaceful and prosperous neighbourhood amongst peer states. A student of European diplomacy before the 20th century might be able to come up with better examples than I.
# cam commented : You could probably argue that the fraternal: european monarchy conducted diplomacy through engagement. They inter-married, were multi-lingual (as they grew up in Germany, France, or Spain before being married off to English or Austrian royals), they did diplomacy with a handshake and a hug, etc. They also used to have family get togethers outside of diplomacy meetings where all the great royal houses would just socialise.
Parliaments were powerful enough by 1914 that great \'house\' diplomacy could not stop the engines of war.
cam
The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution depends upon the problem of law-governed external relations among nations and cannot be solved until the latter is.(more)
Australia has not produced a Defence White Paper since 2000. I recently argued that
we needed a new Defence White Paper
as the 2003 Update and Defence Capability Plan were not sufficient enough to determine future defence doctrine. The United States military recently released the
Quadrennial Defense Review Report [QDR]
which acts as a similar statement on doctrine, capability and force planning as the Defence White Paper does in Australia. Since Australia adheres to the
"Great and Powerful Friends"
doctrine of foreign policy where Australian forces accept American leadership and the ADF is designed to slot in transparently into US forces, this will have an effect on Australian doctrine as well.
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John Reeve calls the Anglo dominance of the oceans the
Lucky League
. Britannia carried blue water supremacy until they obsoleted themselves with the Dreadnought. British supremacy lingered until World War II, when the United States leap-frogged them, and all other nations in a four year bound. America has been the barely disputed champion of the oceans since. Reeve argues that our tangential inclusion in that Anglo dominance has been positive for Australia. He is arguing for the Great and Powerful Friends doctrine [GAPF] of foreign policy.
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Australia was reliant upon the British Foreign Office for its foreign policy until the Department of External Affairs grew in cabinet importance in the 1940s. Previously the department had not been focused on foreign policy at all. Central to the department's new importance in foreign affairs was the changing circumstance of the Cold War, the decolonisation of former European Empires and the loss of power and prestige of Britain. Another reason, was the vibrant energy of Herbert Vere "Doc" Evatt.
The path to an independent foreign affairs department was not simple, other cabinet heavyweights such as defence, trade, immigration and even the Prime Minister were keen to protect their bureaucratic turf and existing power. There was also the question of competing philosophies on foreign policy - the advent of the United Nations and Soviet aggression was to bring those philosophies into sharp focus. (more)
# siento commented : The US alliance: Nice article, it\'s interesting to think about the short history of Australia\'s foreign service and independent foreign relations.
The question is what does Australia get out of the US alliance and is this enough? Arguably we get security, but that requires believing that someone is actually out to get us in the first place. We do also get things like free trade agreements which are hopefully of use.
Also, Australia culturally is part of the Anglo-sphere, and unless we all start reading other languages our ideas and policy are going to be influenced strongly from other English speaking countries.
Really, Australia is highly unlikely to be doing things any other way.
The other thing to consider was that during the Cold War there was a genuinely menacing enemy (as opposed to the current imagined one) in charge of a country that was expansionist and that had an ideaology that was, quite literally, deadly.
The Cold War only ended 15 years ago. Since the Cold War there has been only occasion on which Australia has been asked to participate in which the world on the whole opposed. And we participated quite cleverly, admittedly over the wishes of a majority of the population, in only sending a few troops.
Australia has also has arguably had some foreign policy success in engaging with Asia, which has been done quietly by successive governments. There has also been some success in the area, putting peace keeping troops into the islands and so on.
# cam commented : Threats: The only nation that can project their military power in such a way to threaten us at the moment is the US. And as you said, we have a strong relationship with them that goes back to when the American merchant ships used to hide Irish convicts and take them back to the US.
Australia and America both have McDonalds, so war, or even open conflict is unlikely.
The other issue is, our main trading partners are Asia. Unfortunately our economy remains dominated by commodities. Only the wine industry has created a powerful value-added export market around our primary production. Most of the stuff we ship off to China and Japan is raw materials.
We are not alone there, Asia is America\'s factories, as well as Australia\'s. But consequently it makes sense for us to align more strongly with where our wealth is coming from. The US just isnt that important there, IIRC in 1990, 63% of our exports went to Asia. I think the US only accounted for about 11%.
The Au-US FTA was a bit of a poisoned pill in copyright/DMCA, and our going to Iraq did not stop the sugar lobby and other agricultural lobbies from have quotas in the \"free\" trade agreement. The US does play power politics, and we are not big enough or nasty enough to have that much notice taken of us. Basically we get shafted if the US decides it wants to shaft us.
All our governments have fallen under the sway of the \"great and powerful friends\" doctrine. Which is based on power politics. Basically Australia is nothing unless it has a big friend that it can try and work concessions out of. But none of the Australian governments, despite their belief in power politics, has done anything to make us a power.
I find that odd. Especially as since we were poised to jump that level at the end of World War II with the residual size of our forces, and the amount of immigration we were accepting.
We have the fifteenth largest economy on the planet, though it is small compared to the US, Japanese and Chinese economies. But our military is known as being small and not independant. Indonesia laughed at us when Howard and Downer tried to play populist power politics by saying we should attack any country that harbours terrorists.
We could destroy Indonesia\'s military capability and communications infrastructure in short order. But maintain any sort of presence? We just dont have that kind of tail in our military. We rely on the US for that kind of projection.
Worse, since Howard is so keen on power politics, he is actually lessening Australian projection, despite the defence white papers claiming that projection over Australia\'s main vulnerabilities (ie the air-sea gap) is the ADF\'s and the government\'s prime concern.
Air Warfare Destroyers arent going to help that. Abrams tanks arent going to help that. The LHDs arent going to help that. Retiring the F111 early means we lose a deterrent that projects across that gap. Replacing them with 400km cruise missiles is a loss of projection.
So Howard, despite trading in power politics, is trading away our hard power, for a closer alliance with the US when it appears we should be going the other direction. Building up our hard power (there is an arms race in Asia atm anyway) and distancing outrselves from the US so we can act more independantly regionally.
There are a lot of contradictions. I always thought Howard\'s strong support for the US was reflexive, and not necessarily thought out from a philosophical point of view. I also believed that the Howard government does not understand defence. They understand the domestic political ramifications of it, which as you mentioned, was to only put enough troops over in Iraq so it didnt become a domestic issue that threatened his popularity, but in terms of establishing a military that is a coherent deterrent capable of projecting hard power - they have no idea.
cam
# cam commented : Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: is
an excellent book
which covers the early history of the department of foreign affairs.
I got it in the National Library\'s bookshop a few years ago when I was searching for the original draft constitution that Inglis-Clark wrote. Apparently it had a Bill of Rights in it that Samuel Griffiths struck out. Inglis-Clark was a romanticist for the American constitution too, so it would be interesting to see what he wrote.
The national library didnt have it, and didnt know what I was talking about.
cam
# siento commented : Lack of power: The point that our trade with Asia is really big is a really strong. We need to strengthen our value adding and add more depth to our exports. This is where the current Liberal government has been poor. In the long run it looks like Australia will become a real Asian country. Hopefully we can get the best of both worlds.
The FTA with the US may be a good thing. The DMCA thing may not be that great. Enforcing the DMCA in Australia might be very difficult. We\'ll have to wait a while to see what happens and even then it will be hard to work it out. Even 10 years after NAFTA there is still a lot of debate about it\'s effects.
What point is there these days in having a military capable of occupation against real hostility? The US - with an approximately half trillion dollar defense budget is being humbled by tens of thousands of guys with explosives, AK-47s and RPGs.
We have sufficient projection, as you say, to cause anyone within a reasonable range pain. That\'s enough. It also makes them feel safe. If we have a carier fleet and marines the Indonesians may feel threatened, and with reason.
Australia can carry out heavy-policing duties as shown by the East Timor stabilisation.
We are certainly pandering to the US. But we are also trying to maintain good relations with everyone else as much as possible.
That\'s fine most of the time. It only really comes to a head when there are things like the current business with China\'s diplomats defecting and in the Middle East where US policy is significantly different to the rest of the world.
The Australian Republican doctrine is built upon, amongst others, principles of independence, autonomy and the belief that Australian solutions to Australian issues are superior. Australian foreign policy has been afflicted for a century by the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine. This foreign policy has been a constant failure, has weakened Australian military capability and is not compatible with Republican principles. Consequently the Australian military needs revision.
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Australian defence is divided in political doctrine between the Regionalists and the Expeditionists. Tempered in with these two doctrines is the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine of foreign policy which both major parties follow. Under the Howard Government Expeditionists have been claiming victory, unfortunately procurement in the last nine years has been highly unfocused, and will have a deleterious effect on Australian projection. The Expeditionist viewpoint is inherently limiting as it is dependent upon the "Great and Powerful Friends" doctrine and cannot serve as the basis for an independent Australian military or foreign policy.
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