Sacha Blumen notes that there have been suggestions that the NSW Labor Party dissolve the Legislative Council which is the upper house in the NSW Parliament.

The Westminster parliamentary system combines the executive and legislative in the lower house. In some parliamentary systems, such as Queensland's and New Zealand's the parliament is unicameral - only has one house. Most however are bicameral and operate with an Assembly (lower house) and Council (upper house).

The Washington System modeled its Congress on the Westminster system minus the executive being in the legislative. However it saw the upper house as being of federal character and representing the states rather than the House which was national in character and represented the people.

At the state level in Australia there isn't so much of that form of split representation. It was originally a compromise between Australian republicans and monarchists; it was originally intended that the upper house would be titled in the same manner as the House of Lords. Dan Deniehy's bunyip aristocracy speech comes from pillorising that constitutional plan.

However, in a Westminster system and the Australian mechanism of block voting and party discipline which Labor has perfected, it is important that there be something to counter executive power. Unlike Washington, in Westminster the executive has complete control of the legislature and money bills. Which is a heady combination for any executive seeking to expand its power and they all do at all times.

It is important that some other body act as a check on the executive. In the Australian forms of Westminster this means checks on the lower house. Currently an upper house is but one mechanism to achieve that.

Queensland suicide squadded their upper house when the Governor was overseas and a politically compliant Lieutenant Governor was instituted. I don't see how it could be done in NSW. Either way it would be bad policy and only lead to poorer governance than exists now.
At Federation the big divide between NSW and Victoria was Free Trade vs Protectionism which played itself out in the national elections for many years until the ascendency of the Deakinist Victorians paved the way for the next eighty years of protectionism until the Hawk Government.

Sacha Blumen points out that the NSW Government has forgotten its economic roots once again and indulged itself in protectionism. Sacha writes:

What can one say? This will lead to NSW residents being subject to higher taxes and charges than necessary, and likely to lead to increased prices due to decreased competition to supply the NSW Government. One wonders how managers in the NSW Government will attempt to run their organisations efficiently given this protectionist policy.

Protectionism is a policy that needs to be resisted despite populist, nativist and nationalist urges.
NSW has two periods of party activity. The first is prior to the 1930s when most governments were minority governments and elections highly competitive. Since the 1930s and the UAP winning the election after Lang's dismissal NSW has seen the increasing party discipline form of government with strong majorities and long electoral success.

The party system as we know it in Australia is Labor's innovation. Prior to Labor's appearance in Australian electoral politics the governments were fluid bodies of coalitions who would often form around a strong leader. Because of the pledge and Labor's discipline to the party's national executive this factional form of organisation was broken.

The Liberals formed in 1904 as a response to Labor and basically out party organised the Protectionists and Ministerialists such that the latter two parties were not electorally competitive. (more)
Oz : It also helped that NSW did not have a split in the 50s unlike Victoria and Queensland (which kept Labor out for a generation).
With the national government digging its selective anti-federalist paws into the Tasmanian Health System it might be a good time to look at the nationalist (as opposed to federalist) structure of government. This usually takes the form of state abolition; where the states are seen as the unnecessary and duplicative level of government. This view has become increasing popular with all the federal parties in the Australian system and numerous advocacy groups. (more)
Via the SMH: "Under the legislation police will have the discretion to demand a hair sample or mouth swab after any arrest, no matter how minor. Police only have to believe that taking the sample will produce evidence linking the offender to a crime. At present samples can only be taken for serious offences such as murder, robbery and sexual assault." (more)
The NSW government has population demographics broken down by health areas. I am assuming AHS means Area Health Sector. The most interesting part of the graph is the 19-34 demographic which dips in the country regions, is flat in Sydney's north and west, and increases in the city's south and south-west. (more)
In 1932 Australia came close to civil war as NSW and the Federal Government fought over defaulted loans and tax rolls. The tensions between Jack Lang and Joe Lyons escalated until Sydney was rife with militia for both sides and the Lighthorse had been moved outside of Canberra to halt any invasion of the ACT from NSW. In the end Phillip Game, the Governor of NSW, dissolved Lang's government. (more)

This version changes how the vacancy of a Governor is handled, using the French method of having a leading legislator temporarily take over caretaker duties until an election is held. The members in a district has been increased to five to match the Tasmanian Assembly structure. (more)
Alan : the right to vote: You\'ve effectively created a right to vote by Paragraph 6 of the exclusions, but you haven\'t defined an elector anywhere. The result is that judicial enforcement of Paragraph 6 becomes impossible.
cam : I added a definitions section: but didn\'t mimic the definition language of the NSW Constitution Act . I couldn\'t find any other words that required defining.

How is your NSW constitution coming along?

cam

An update to the prior gubernatorial NSW constitution . Includes removal of the Governor and what occurs in a vacancy. Also formalises succession from the Speaker and requires an immediate election to replace the Governor. Avo's Bill of Rights have been included. Tampering with the electoral system is now an out on the ear offence too. (more)
Alan : executive succession: I don\'t think the speaker is a good choice as the acting governor, especially if you require resignation. Strangely enough it was written up in today\'s Washington Post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/02/AR2007030201141.html .
I would specify a time limit for a new gubernatorial election. The \'until a new election can be held\' language is what allowed a VP to declare himself (probably illegally and almost certainly contrary to what was intended) not acting, but permanent, president in the US. A better choice for a shot-term stopgap official would be the chief justice, or perhaps just the cabinet in orer of seniority.

Speakers resign in the US only because, as the articles says, their succession act is extremely dubious in constitutional terms because it allows a member of congress to become president. To avoid any doubt the speaker has to resign his seat.
cam : I agree with Truman: from that article it seems, I think the Speaker has greater confidence because they are an elected position, that has the confidence of their electorate and the majority of the House. I am not prepared to accept the party argument - where the House may be a majority of a different party to the executive - especially when the Cabinet is appointed, as it would be in this constitution. Which is why I do not like the idea of cabinet succession or a chief justice. I think the Speaker is the most democratic choice. Since I made it so there is a gubernatorial bi-election (?) on your suggestion, I think the Speaker can be tolerated for a short period after resigning from the House.

Good point on setting a time limit on the election to stop usurpation. What is reasonable, administratively, but also restrictive enough to stop an executive state of emergency/exception like what Bangladesh is undergoing. 7 days? 14 days?

cam
cam : The other downside of the Speaker being elevated: is that it can cause turmoil in the House at a time when you want political stability and legislative strength. The Speaker has to be elected from the House in that constitution. Parties cannot always be guaranteed to act in national, stable or common weal.

cam
Alan : the Pelosi administration: Let\'s imagine that both Bush and Cheney leave office in the near unexpectedly for whatever reason. You would not catch me weeping. However, President Pelosi would be left with an impossible situation, A divided America would then have to face a crisis of legitimacy in which the government changed hands without an election. Although Pelosi is elected as representative and as speaker she has only ever faced election in her own district and was relatively unknown until she became speaker.

BTW, since you are using the speaker only as a stopgap, what not simply provide that the speaker cannot vote or preside in the Legislature while acting as governor? There is really no reason for the forced resignation, especially for such a short time as interim governor.

IN France, where the president of the senate becomes interim president of the republic, he happily goes back to the senate as soon as soon a s a new presidential election is copulated.
cam : Cool: That is a probably a better arrangement while still keeping the confidence of the house and having a democratically elected representative. I will do a v0.3 without the forced resignation and a time limit on the transition to the next election.

cam
cam : Found the relevant section: in the French Constitution :

Should the Presidency of the Republic fall vacant for any reason whatsoever, or should the Constitutional Council on a reference from the Government rule by an absolute majority of its members that the President of the Republic is incapacitated, the duties of the President of the Republic, with the exception of those specified in articles 11 and 12, shall be temporarily exercised by the President of the Senate or, if the latter is in turn incapacitated, by the Government.

In the case of a vacancy, or where the incapacity of the President is declared permanent by the Constitutional Council, the ballot for the election of the new President shall, except in the event of a finding by the Constitutional Council of force majeure, be held not less than twenty days and not more than thirty-five days after the beginning of the vacancy or the declaration that the incapacity is permanent.

It also suggests a window of twenty to thirty-five days for the elections to be held in. It is interesting that the French Constitution allows for temporary and permanent vacancy.

cam
Alan : ouch: I really need to watch my spell-checker more carefully. You\'ve inspired to produce my own NSW constitution, but without my expansive bill of rights or too much playing around. The language of the NSW constitution is horrendous.

You should also consider providing:

who has the right to vote

how the governor is elected (preferential voting is the obvious choice)

how the legislature is elected (the 3 member districts are not ideal for proportional representation)

how distributions are done
cam : Since it is a state constitution: I want to leave enough room for statutorial innovation within the character of the constitution. So the constitution describes the framework but allows permutations outside of the constitution but within the character. So I don\'t want to limit how the Governor is elected, just demand the Governor be elected, so there leaves some room for innovation.

On who has the right to vote, since this is a conservative constitution, I have left that to an electoral act, where hopefully the act catches up to universal political equality which I think is necessary for good republican governance. IIRC in the CFC I made the defn of an elector anyone above the age of reason under the jurisdiction of the government.

On the three reps per district, I should mimic the Tasmanian electoral structure exactly, since that is what I want and make it five members per district.

cam
Alan : minimal rights: The argument for including the right to vote is that it is the people. not their representatives, who should determine who can vote. The same applies to the method of voting. Now, it\'s impossible to imagine that a governor would not be elected by IRV, but again, it\'s an invitation to political manipulation to allow parliament to mess about with that process.

Once can imagine a governor with who enjoyed a relative, but not absolute majority, in the electorate being very anxious to ensure that preferences do not come into play or that they do not need to face a runoff. It\'s even possible to imagine someone with a track record like Nick Minchin arguing for an electoral college or something equally bizarre.*

It\'s a short step from there to argue that IRV is a fundamental right that ensures that everyone in the electorate has an opportunity to have their vote counted, not just those who vote for the two leading candidates.

*Minchin gave us the current felony disfranchisement in the federal act and early closure of the rolls. His original cabinet submission on the republic referendum contained 10 questions and the republican option would have been to vote no to the first 9 questions and yes and to the last question.
cam : I am not so glued on to preferential voting: In certain instances, such as single member districts, I think first past the post is better in stopping a duopoly. Preference voting in the Federal House as effectively made it a non-pluralistic body.

I am also aware that every electoral change has been to try and game the system so that the current incumbent maintains/keeps their majority (Chifley and the Senate for instance) but they have pretty much backfired (Labor has never had a majority in the Senate since). IIRC only Steele Hall has made an electoral change for altruistic reasons knowing that it would cost him his government.

I know the current mob in government have used their ideology of \'civic obligation\' to disenfranchise citizens. But that has been covered in the excelusions which make it unconsitutional to disenfranchise an elector. There comes a point where I dont want to load the constitution with so much information/regulation such that it loses its character. Since I have made it only changeable by amendments, it will be slow and hard to change, much more so than if it was a statutory document as most of the current NSW Constitution is, so I dont want to limit innovation outside of the constitution as long as the body retains its constitutional character.

That will mean some not cool stuff will happen - politicians do tend to be party-machine selfish - but it will allow for any future electoral technology changes to be tried/used/adapted.

cam

I believe that a separate executive is a more democratic form of government than a parliamentary system . In certain situations a gubernatorial system is superior to a parliamentary one. NSW is one such example that would benefit from a separate executive. So here is a gubernatorial NSW constitution which contains nothing innovative or new; it is a modern permutation of the current NSW Constitution Act . (more)
Felix the Cassowary : Seats, disqualification.: Three members per seats doesn\'t sound like it\'s going to achieve anything, except having thre times the number of members needed (or, a third as much representation as you could get). I would also put such things into regular legislation...

The Governor/A member of the Legislature is disqualified from serving in the Executive/Legislature if: ... convicted of an infamous crime carrying a term of greater than ten years.

or tampering with the electoral system, regardless of the term, of course.
cam : I put the three members per seat in: as it is unicameral so it requires some sort of proportional system to get the pluralism that an upper house allows. Since an electoral act could sabotage that by making it single member electorates with preferential voting (effectively a two-party duopoly) I thought that character of the system needed to be elevated to the constitutional.

Good point on tampering with the electoral system.

cam
Alan : Removal?: I tend to agree with you at state level, although it\'s important for a national government to have a dual executive to prevent presidents from spending too much time masquerading as a man on horseback or in a flightsuit.

I\'m interested in your proposal. How would you provide for removals?
cam : Dont know on removal: As I didn\'t want to put in something too blunt. Not for the state level anyway. What you do for removal inside that style of constitution?

cam
Alan : Removal?: Well, an irremovable executive is a very bad idea. The constitution needs to allow for impeachment or recall. I\'d suugest allowing the the Legislature to impeach the governor before a citizens jury with the chief justice as moderator. Imeachment should not be restricted to high crimes and misdeneanours, which makes it almost useless in the US.

A Novostrocambrianisation of South Africa\'s rule would read:
89 Removal of Governor
(1) The Legislature, by a resolution adopted with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members, may remove the Governor from office only on the grounds of-
(a) a serious violation of the Constitution or the law;
(b) serious misconduct; or
(c) inability to perform the functions of office.

You also need to provide for vacancies in the governorship. I\'d argue really strongly that a governor should always be elected and US-style succession belongs back in the Middle Ages. Maybe the chief justice should take over for a brief time until an election can be held.
cam : I decided against an elected: Lieutenant Governor or Attorney General. I didnt want a Lieutenant Governor in the system as they would pollute up the legislative. I am comfortable with the Speaker becoming the Governor until the next election. The legislative has a frequency of 2 years between elections, so a deposed Speaker-become-Governor at max would be 24 months in the job. I would prefer the Speaker to a Chief Justice as the Speaker has to have the confidence of their electorate and the house.

The snippet taken from the South African constitution is good and seems a wise inclusion.

cam
Cam Riley: South Sea Republic. Freedom, liberty, equity and an Australian Republic.